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1 
                                         ABSTRACT 
 
Investments in a national economy are essential to stimulate economic growth and 
development, which in turn improves the living standards of its citizens.  The stock 
market offers greater opportunities for investment by companies and international 
investors.  Much has changed in securities trading with the advancement of technology 
and so with the ways fraud occurs on the market, ripping off assets of companies and 
ultimately investors. Corporate crimes are committed with the help of insiders who may 
be a director, employee or an officer of the company.  Well functioning financial markets, 
proper criminal justice system and well-designed institutions, as well as regulatory 
systems facilitates investments and economic development.   
 
The interrelationships between insider trading, investments and the overall economic 
activity in the corporate environment is a major concern and of interest to policy makers, 
economists, academics, businessmen and the public at large.  Insider traders gain 
advantage of non-public information obtained from various sources within the 
management of the company to trade and make abnormal profits, which seem to be 
difficult to abate with all the laws in place.  The paper examines some of the intricacies of 
insider trading.  It is argued against the backdrop of the two schools of thought of 
prohibition or allowing insider trading in public listed companies, the extent to which 
insider trading regulation in South Africa has been effective in reducing private 
information trading.  
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                                              CHAPTER 1 
 
                OVERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The regulation of insider trading on the securities market is a subject matter of great 
interest to policy makers, investors and the general public. A public company listed on the 
JSE Securities Exchange and on any stock exchange have an advantage of raising more 
capital from the public but carries with it the risk of abuse by the corporate officers 
entrusted with the management of the company.  They may trade in the securities of the 
company by making use of confidential information about the company’s activities to 
make profit or avoid loss at the expense of outside investors.  Price-sensitive information 
that is not available to the public is regarded as private or confidential information.  
 
There has been much controversy about the use of confidential information about 
corporate activities in dealing in securities by persons having such non-public information 
and has been prohibited in most countries.  The fact that controversy exist on the use of 
privileged information for dealing in securities on capital markets suggest that there is no 
single best answer to the problem of insider trading and will continue to keep the debate 
alive. The generally accepted view is that insider trading is wrong and it should be 
regulated. However, not everyone regards the regulation of insider trading as being 
desirable. 
 
Proponents of insider trading argue that permitting insider trading would be an efficient 
compensation mechanism for corporate insiders for creating wealth.1 They argue that 
allowing insider trading will provide an incentive to insiders for innovation and 
developing new products or encourage them to develop strategic plan to increase 
productivity which will lead to increase in the value of shares of the company and in turn 
benefit the shareholders.  
 
                                               
1
 Henry G Manne Insider Trading and the Stock Market (New York: Free Press 1966) 138 – 141.  
3 
Ausubel discusses arguments in favour of insider trading and points out that if insider 
trading is permitted, insiders are motivated to gather more new information in order to 
make profit. As the insiders trade, the information gathered by them becomes rapidly 
reflected in the securities prices and this contributes to capital-asset pricing which leads to 
efficient markets.2  It could be argued that even if this economic efficiency is accepted, it 
ignores the reality that insider trading damages investor confidence in the integrity of the 
financial markets.3 
 
Insider trading is seen as commercially immoral and should be prohibited.  It is argued 
that outside investors will be at a disadvantage and such insider trading malpractice may 
even drive away potential investors. The rationale being that investors will be reluctant to 
invest in a market where insiders trade on private information to make undue profits or 
avoid personal losses at their expense without legislative control.  For example corporate 
insiders may engage in activities that may lower long-term value of the company and this 
will harm the investments of shareholders.4  They may undertake production and 
investment decisions that will increase the volatility of company’s securities prices and 
destabilize the firm’s performance in order take advantage of the price swings.5  This 
tends to discourage corporate investment and reduce market efficiency. Therefore 
regulation is deemed necessary to preserve confidence in the markets.  ‘Good corporate 
governance dictates that there should be rules regulating insider trading to prevent 
potential abuses by insiders and for companies to avoid being vicariously liable.’6  
                                                                                                                                           
Regulators advance an argument against insider trading that it is a breach of fiduciary 
duty.  Directors, managers and to some extent other employees become fiduciaries for the 
firms they manage on behalf of the shareholders.7  The insiders breach a fiduciary duty or 
other relationships of trust and confidence by trading in securities of the company based 
on material confidential information. A person owing a fiduciary duty should not use 
                                               
2
 Lawrence M Ausubel ‘Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy’ (1990) 80 American 
  Economic Review 1022 at 1025. 
3
 MJ Fishman  and KM Hagerty ‘Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices’ (1992) 23 RAND 
  Journal of Economics 106 at 106.                                                                                                                     
4
 Alexandre Padilla ‘Can Regulation Eliminate the Agency Problems Posed by Insider     
   Trading?’ (2005) 2 Commentaries on Law & Economics 47at 50. 
5
 Ibid  
6
 Tshepo Mongalo et al  Forms of Business Enterprise: Theory, Structure and Operation (Cape Town: 
      New Africa Books, 2004) 304. 
7
 Jennifer Moore ‘What is really Unethical about Insider Trading?’ (1990) 9 Journal of Business Ethics  
    171 at 178.     
4 
corporate confidential information for personal gain and avoid conflicts of interests.  
Insiders trading on confidential information will affect the reputation of the company and 
the value of its securities.                                                                                                                
 
Another justification for regulating insider trading is that it is a misappropriation of 
information amounting to theft of valuable corporate property from rightful owners.8 The 
misappropriation theory holds that the information used by insider traders is stolen as it 
belongs to the corporation.  Whatever gain made by the insiders without the owner’s 
permission belongs to it.  
 
In South Africa, insider trading is a criminal offence and offenders may incur civil 
liabilities or both.9  The underlying philosophy banning insider trading in South Africa is 
contained in the statement of aims in section 2 of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 
which includes increasing confidence in the South African financial markets, promoting 
the protection of regulated persons and clients, reduction of systematic risk and the 
promotion of international competitiveness of securities services in the Republic. Previous 
legislative attempts to regulate insider trading failed to yield successful prosecutions.10  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
1.1.1 PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Although much work has been done by academics, lawyers and economists on insider 
trading and continues to attract attention from the media and government functionaries, 
certain questions are not yet satisfactorily answered.  The paper examines some of the 
intricacies involved in the regulation of insider trading in order to ascertain what is really 
wrong with insider trading. The approach is three fold: firstly, it explores the historical 
developments, arguments in favour of insider trading and arguments offered as 
justification for the regulation of insider trading. Secondly, the South African legislation 
regulating insider trading is reviewed for potential weaknesses. Thirdly, it assesses the 
                                               
8
 RW Painter ‘Insider Trading and the Stock Market Thirty Years Later’, (1999) 50 (2) Case 
  Western Reserve Law Review 305 at 305 - 306  
9
 Securities Services Act, 2004 ( Act No.36 of 2004 ) 
10
 Tom Wixley & Geoff Everingham Corporate Governance 2ed (Cape Town: Siber Ink 2005) 37. 
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effectiveness of insider trading laws enforcement.  The research is intended to make a 
modest contribution to knowledge and the development of the law in this field.   
  
1.1.2 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
 
Chapter 1 gives a general overview of insider trading and covers the historical 
background of its regulation.  It also explains the role of the stock market and information 
in relation to insider trading in the corporate environment.                                        
Chapter 2 focuses on the arguments in favour of insider trading.                                                                       
Chapter 3 gives an account of the arguments for the prohibition of insider trading 
regulation.                             
Chapter 4 examines key provisions in the South African law prohibiting insider                 
 trading and highlight its weakness.                   
Chapter 5 assesses the effectiveness of insider trading regulations.  It touches on the 
challenges regulators encounter in the regulatory environment and examines records of 
insider trading laws enforcement.                                                                                                                       
Chapter 6 concludes the paper by highlighting the findings and its implications on issues 
relating to insider trading regulation.     
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
1.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF INSIDER TRADING 
 
Some trading in the securities of a company by corporate insiders is legal and others are 
illegal depending on whether there has been a breach of fiduciary duties or some 
relationship of trust and confidence or regulations governing the trading.  Corporate 
insiders may be directors, officers or employees of the company.                 
 
Trading by insiders is legal when the corporate insiders buy and sell securities in their 
own company within the confines of the law.  This depends on company policy, 
securities regulations and company law of a nation and other general enabling laws.  In 
some companies, directors are offered share options as a form of remuneration and are 
able to trade in such securities.  In the United States, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) which oversees the regulation of securities, require insiders to report 
6 
when they trade in their own securities.11   In South Africa, the Companies Act 61 of 
1973 recognizes the ownership of securities by employees of their company.12  Buying 
or selling of such securities is legal.   
 
The concept of insider trading, is used to refer to the illegal form of buying and selling 
of securities when those corporate insiders in privileged positions who are in possession 
of confidential price-sensitive information about the company’s activities  trade and 
make profit for themselves or avoid losses or do so for other persons.     
 
1.3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
 
The main function of a modern business organization is to maximize profits for 
investors and promote healthy economic co-operation among other stakeholders such as 
employees, suppliers, creditors, customers and the community at large.  Any fraudulent 
activity by corporate insiders for personal gain or to serve selfish interest using 
confidential information about the company’s activity, not only violates their duties of 
good faith, obedience, diligence and loyalty to the company and its shareholders, but it 
is capable of destroying the livelihood and interests of other stakeholders. This makes 
misuse of insider information reprehensible.  Although, insider trading is as old as the 
stock exchange itself,13 its regulation intensified during the later part of the last century. 
 
1.3.1 THE COMMON LAW 
 
Directors are given wide discretion to oversee the smooth running of companies to 
achieve its objectives of incorporation but have a duty to use reasonable diligence to 
protect and safeguard corporate property.  Companies generate a lot of information in 
the course of their business activities.  Some of the information is confidential and the 
corporation has exclusive rights to it and the company is entitled to keep the information 
                                               
11
 Gerald Acquaah-Gaisie ‘Toward more effective corporate governance mechanisms’ (2005) 18 Aust 
   Jnl of Corp Law 1 at 33. 
12
 Section 38(2)(b) of the Companies Act recognizes ownership of securities by corporate insiders and a    
    company may give financial assistance for the purchase of its own shares, in accordance with any 
    scheme for the time being in force for employees of the company, including any director holding a 
    salaried employment or office in the company.   
  
13
 Brenda Hannigan Insider Dealing (London: Kluwer Law Publishers, 1988) 1 
7 
obtained and assembled as private property.14 A director has a duty to protect this 
property of the company and he may not use it for his personal interests or unlawfully 
disclose trade secrets to any person.  A director, employee or any officer of the company 
who abuses his position by making use of confidential information is to required account 
to the company and disgorge the profit made or loss avoided. 
 
The law recognizes a company as a separate legal entity distinct from its owners.  
Directors control the company and its success or failure depends on them.  They have 
access to management, company premises and all company information.  The common 
law position on misuse of insider information is based on the decision in the English 
case of Percival v Wright,15 which established that a director of a company owes no 
general duty to the individual shareholders to disclose price-sensitive information to 
them but only to the company itself.  The plaintiffs were shareholders of the company 
and offered to sell their shares to the directors of the company who were in possession                                                                                                                              
of information about a pending take-over bid but kept it secret.  After negotiations and 
completion of the transfers, the plaintiffs discovered that the directors knew the true 
value of their shares because of the information they had at their disposal and they 
sought to get the transaction set aside in order to avoid the transfer on the ground that 
the directors had a duty to disclose that information.  It was held that there was no such 
duty.  The decision has been criticized as being calamitous but has had remarkable 
career and tremendous impact on the development of company law in the common law 
jurisdiction of the world.16 
 
The underlying principle in the decision being that the directors stand in a fiduciary 
relationship with regard to the company and owe their duties to the company as a whole. 
This expression has traditionally been used to mean the shareholders as a collective 
body. Thus, a director is in a position of trust and is obliged to act in the interest of the 
company and not in his own interests or that of shareholders as individuals.  However, 
there may be circumstances where directors do owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders 
                                               
14
 William E Knepper Liability of Corporate Officers and Directors 3ed (Indianapolis, Indiana: The 
    Allen Smith Co., 1978) 56 - 57  
15
 [1902] 2 Ch 421. 
16
 Aaron Yoran Insider Trading in Israel and England (Jerusalem: Alpha Press 1972) 1 
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individually requiring disclosure of information as decided by the Privy Council in Allen 
v Hyatt,17 as where the directors acted as the shareholders’ agents.                                                                         
 
United States courts have generally circumvented the decision in Percival v Wright by 
extending the categories of special circumstances requiring disclosure.18  In Coleman v 
Myers,19  the New Zealand Court of Appeal, held the directors liable to shareholders of a 
small family company in a take-over bid, where a fiduciary duty arose because of the 
special relationship that existed between them.  
 
 Recently, Coleman v Myers was approved and followed in the English case of Platt v 
Platt20at the first instance, where the court accepted counsel’s submission that the 
directors’ fiduciary duties carrying with them a duty of disclosure of insider information 
to shareholders in certain special circumstances existed because the director controlled 
the company’s affairs and the other shareholders were dependent on him for information 
about its business and their shareholdings.  On appeal, this point was not considered by 
the Court of Appeal but members of the court went out of their way and stated that it did 
not imply approval of the first instance decision.21  Therefore, it may be too early to 
write off Percival v Wright in the English jurisdiction.   
 
In Australia, recognition was given to the existence of fiduciary relationship between 
directors and individual shareholders in Glandon Pty Limited v Strata Consolidated Pty 
Limited.22  The authority of Percival v Wright was abandoned in the New South Wales 
case of Brunninghausen v Glavanics.23    
 
South African common law treatment of insider trading is fundamentally the same as the 
English courts.  A fiduciary relationship exists between the directors and a company. 
They are not obliged to disclose insider information to individual shareholders.  Other 
corporate insiders, officers and employees in possession of information derived from a 
company which is not available to other investors are also not obliged to disclose to 
                                               
17
 (1914) 30 TLR 444 (PC). 
18
 Francis Rose Company Law in a Nutshell 5ed (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2001) 25 
19
 [1977] 2 NZLR 225. 
20
 (ChD 1999) [1999] 2 BCLC 745; (CA 2000) [2001] 1 BCLC 698.   
21
 Ibid at 704 and 719 
22
 (1993) 11 ACLC 895. 
23
 (1999) 46 NSWLR 538. 
9 
outsiders. However, South African judicial decisions may be influenced by Australian 
case law and give recognition of a fiduciary duty to shareholders in special 
circumstances where this duty would not compete with the fiduciary duty to the 
company. Blackman et al asserts that there is an indication that our courts may be 
prepared to depart from the rule in Percival v Wright and that it can no longer be 
categorically said that no fiduciary relationship exists between the director and the 
shareholders of his company.24 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
1.3.2 STATUTORY CONTROL  
 
Legislative attempts to regulate insider trading began in North America and later shifted 
to the rest of the world. 
 
In the United States, insider trading became an offence with the passing of the Securities 
Act of 1933 and 1934 to restore public confidence in the markets after the 1929 stock 
market crash.  The framework of securities regulation was created by the Securities Act 
of 1933 which required companies to make certain detailed disclosures before offering 
securities for sale in interstate commerce.  Congress enacted the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 to regulate sales and purchases of securities and protect investors against 
manipulations and deceptions.25  
 
Provision was made in section 16(b) of the Exchange Act to deal specifically with 
insider trading by corporate insiders profiting from trading the stock market pricing 
inefficiencies of their company.  Section 16(b) enables the company to recover any 
profits realized by an insider dealing in the securities of the company within any six-
month period of the transaction. Then in 1942, the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) which regulates securities trading on financial markets promulgated 
rule 10b-5 as an extension of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as a 
residual anti-fraud prohibition.   
 
                                               
24
  MS Blackman et al Commentaries on the Companies Act (Cape Town: Juta 2002-2005) Vol.1 at 5-389. 
 
25
 Bernard Bergmans Insider Information and Securities Trading: A legal and economic analysis of the  
   foundations of liability in the U.S.A. and the European Community (London: Graham & Trotman,  
   1991) 9.    
10 
 Rule 10b-5 is a general anti-fraud provision which does not explicitly mention insider 
trading but it has been used the SEC and the courts to deal with fraud on the securities 
market and insider trading based on judicial interpretation of the rule.  It states that: 
 
   It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality 
  of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange: 
(1) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order 
to make the statement made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon   
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
 
Under this famous Rule 10b-5, which outlaws deceptive practices, misstatements and 
half-truths, over the years has been used to shape US insider trading laws.  Two 
legislation on insider trading passed by Congress, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 
1984 (ITSA) and the Insider Trading Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 
(ITSFEA) made enforcement more rigorous.   
      
In Canada, the major legislative step taken to make insider trading illegal was the 
Attorney General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario (Kimber Committee) 
recommendations of 1965 which were translated into legislation in the following year in 
the 1966 Ontario Securities Act.  The provisions made for prohibition of insider trading 
in section 113 of the 1966 Act were substantially similar to the present section 131 of 
the Canada Business Corporations Act of 1985.  Section 113 of the 1966 Act provided 
that “every insider of a corporation or associate or affiliate of such an insider, who in 
connection with a transaction” in corporate securities, “makes use of any specific 
confidential information” material to the value of the securities in question was liable to 
compensate “any person or company for any direct loss suffered by such person or 
company as a result of such transaction,” and in addition, the defendant was “also 
accountable to the corporation for any benefit or advantage received or receivable…as a 
result of such transaction.”26   
 
                                               
26
  FH Buckley et al Corporations: Principles and Policies 3ed (Toronto: Emond Montgomery  
    Publications Ltd., 1995) 799 
11 
Insider trading regulation on the European continent took off in France with the 
introduction of Ordonnance 67-833 of 28 September 1967, which established the 
Commission des Operations Bourse and implemented reporting procedure following the 
pattern of section 16 of the American Securities Exchange Act of 1934.27  Insider 
trading became a criminal offence there in 1970.   The Ordonnance was amended in 
1983, 1988 and 1989 with the view to widening its scope and improving its 
effectiveness for prosecution of offenders.  The criminalization of insider trading in 
France received strong opposition against its regulation. 
 
The French attempt inspired the European Commission (EC) to deal with the insider 
trading problem and generated interest in other European countries to follow suit.  The 
EC proposal of a common standard in the early 70’s to address insider trading problems 
in member states took a long time to finally come with a directive, the EC Insider 
Dealing Directive (Dir 89/592 [1989]) which has subsequently received some 
amendments and adopted by member states. 
 
Germany introduced Insider Trading Guidelines in 1970 by the Commission of Stock 
Exchange Experts and the Ministry of Economy.  This was amended in 1976 and 1988.  
The rules were optional and not mandatory.  It had only voluntary codes against misuse of 
insider information and applied only to those companies and banks which expressly 
adopted.  Prosecution of insiders was therefore limited to those business organizations 
which have voluntarily bound themselves to the guidelines.28 This soft and voluntary 
approach received criticisms although they achieved some measure of success indirectly 
because they were used as the basis for disciplining of insider traders by their employers 
who have adopted and incorporated the Insider Trading Guidelines into contracts of 
employment.29  Insider trading was criminalized in Germany in 1994 with the passing of 
the Wertpapierhandelsgesetz or Securities Trading Act which introduced the EC Insider 
Dealing Directive (Dir 89/592 [1989] OJ L334/30) into German law. 30  
 
United Kingdom (UK) only passed a general legislation criminalizing insider trading or 
insider dealing (British terminology) for the first time in 1980.  Provisions were made in 
                                               
27
 Bergmans (note 25) at 67  
28
 Ibid 
29
 Mark Stamp and Carson Welsh (ed) International Insider Dealing (London: FT Law & Tax, 1996) 130.  
30
 Ibid 
12 
Part V (sections 68 - 73) of the Companies Act of 1980 for the offence of insider dealing 
and those were re-enacted in the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act of 1985.31  
The provisions supplement the equitable rules relating to directors’ fiduciary duties.  It 
was amended by the Financial Services Act of 1986.  ‘In 1989, a Directive 
(89/592/EEC) was adopted to coordinate regulations on insider dealing throughout the 
European Union. This has been implemented in the UK law by part V (ss 52 to 64) of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1993, which was brought into force on 1 March 1994 by SI 
1994/242.  The new law is more focused on the control the control of securities markets 
than the abuse of confidential information.’32  
 
 In South Africa, insider trading became a statutory offence with the introduction of 
section 233 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 following the Main Report (RP 45/1970) 
of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act which was 
established in 1963 under the chairmanship of Justice Jan van Wyk de Vries.  There was 
not a singular success of prosecution of insider trading offenders and legislation was 
repeatedly amended.33  
 
A Committee was established in 1995 by the Minister of Finance to investigate the 
insider trading provisions under the chairmanship of Mr Mervin King (SC). The King 
Task Group published its final report on 21 October 1997.  A new legislation on insider 
trading was enacted following the recommendations of the Committee.   The insider 
trading prohibition then contained in section 440F of the Companies Act was repealed 
by section 17 of the new Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998 in January 1999.   Offences of 
insider trading were contained in section 2 of the Insider Trading Act.  This legislation 
although made insider trading a criminal offence, also had no success of prosecutions. 
However, the JSE and the Financial Services Board intervened on a number of occasions 
and several directors paid fines without actually admitting guilt. 34   
 
                                               
31
 Stephen Mayson et al Mayson, French &Ryan on Company Law 20ed (Oxford: Oxford University  
    Press 2003) 377 
32
 Ibid 
33
 JG Van der Merwe et al South African Corporate Business Administration (Cape Town: Juta 1995 – 
     2005) 15-15 
34
 Tom Wixley & Geoff Everingham (note 10) at 37. 
13 
The present legislation regulating insider trading, the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 
came into operation on 1 February 2005.  Details of its provisions are discussed below in 
chapter 4. 
 
 
1.4 ROLE OF THE STOCK MARKET 
 
In studying the impact of insider trading in corporate environment, it is essential at this 
stage to examine the basic role of the stock market in the economy.  Stock markets such 
as the JSE Securities Exchange help to stimulate growth and investment by bringing 
together companies and people who invest in them. It provides a financial market for the 
buying and selling of securities of companies and therefore the prevention of insider 
trading is seen as an important function of the stock market.  As a result financial 
markets around the world and governments, devote significant resources to regulate 
insider trading. The primary aim of regulation is to achieve market efficiency. 
 
1.4.1 THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
  
The stock market plays an important role in allocating capital and for it to operate 
efficiently and without inhibition, they require the confidence and respect from their 
own societies and increasingly, from the international community.35  The stock market 
serves as an arena within which share values can be accurately or efficiently priced.  
However, ‘stock price efficiency is not sufficient for economic efficiency; stock market 
efficiency may not be necessary for investment efficiency if the banking system can 
serve as an alternative institution for efficiently allocating investment resources.’36 The 
ideal securities market is one which does a good job of allocating capital in the economy 
leading to a situation where the price of each security accurately reflects the risk and 
return in its future.  
 
Active markets such as the New York Stock Exchange, London Stock Exchange and the 
JSE Securities Exchange are relatively efficient, made up of rational investors who react 
                                               
35
 Barry Rider and Michael Ashe Insider Crime: The New Law (Bristol: Jordans, 1993) 6. 
36
 WKS Wang and  MI Steinberg Insider Trading: 2000 Supplement (New York: Aspen 
     Law & Business, 2000) 7. 
14 
quickly and objectively to new information on the market.  The efficient market 
hypothesis is a basic theory describing the behaviour of an assumed “perfect” market in 
which: 
 
1. ‘Securities are typically in equilibrium, meaning that they are fairly priced and 
their expected returns equal their required returns.’37 In competitive markets with 
many active participants, the interactions of many buyers and sellers using their 
assessment of an asset’s risk and return to determine its value, results in an 
equilibrium – the market value – for each security based on available 
information.38  
2. ‘At any point in time, security prices fully reflect all public information available 
about the firm and its securities, and these prices react swiftly to new 
information.’39  That buyers and sellers are assumed to immediately digest new 
information and take informed decision. 
3. Since stocks are fully and fairly priced, investors need not waste their time  
trying to find and capitalize on undervalued or overvalued securities.40 
 
The stock market can be regarded as an example of an efficient market since prices of 
stocks and shares are fairly determined by market forces of demand and supply. No one 
is mandated to influence price determination and the ruling price of shares is a reflection 
performance of the underlying fundamentals in the market.  The stock market becomes 
efficient when information is readily disseminated to all market participants and it does 
not neglect any information relevant to the determination of security prices. Thus, 
information ought to be rationally and quickly conveyed into the share prices. Insider 
dealers may withhold valuable information which its release can affect determination of 
securities prices.  
 
The JSE Securities Exchange functions as both a primary and secondary capital 
market.41 As a primary market, a public listed company issue new shares and debentures 
to raise capital and the proceeds go directly to the company. The shares may be issued to 
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new shareholders or existing ones.  As a secondary market in capital, the Securities 
Exchange facilitates the buying and selling of securities by existing shareholders or 
investors of a particular company.  
 
Both the primary and the secondary markets offer opportunities for corporate insiders to 
cash in on price sensitive non-public information about the company’s activities.  The 
problem is acute in the secondary market. However, those in favour of allowing insider 
trading argue that when insiders trade on the secondary market, they speed up the flow 
of information and serve to feed their knowledge and forecasts into the prices, thus 
making the markets more efficient.  
 
1.5 INFORMATION AND INSIDER TRADING 
 
A company generates information merely by its legal existence through incorporation 
and more information is generated as it carries on with its business. The flow of 
information through the market is important for business transactions. Information about 
a company, commercial enterprise or any commodity is what the market relies on to 
determine its value or price.  The more information about a company’s activities, 
products or services that gets through to the market the better the public recognition it 
receives and this widens the scope of the market for that business organization.  Just 
how valuable the information is, depends on the nature of the information and the 
number of people who know about it.  
 
Information affecting securities prices of a company may be external or internal. The 
external information may be of international or national origin. Due to globalization, 
matters of international concern such as economic recession in major trading partners of 
a country and wide foreign exchange fluctuations on emerging markets may affect the 
securities market.  ‘On a national level, specific corporate information is the life-blood 
of any securities market because it can and does have a direct effect on the price of 
securities to which it relates.  In many instances, such information will relate to matters 
of corporate economics; for instance, profit forecasts or warnings.  It may relate to 
internal reorganisations within companies and could, for instance, detail any comings 
16 
and goings amongst board of directors or other employees.’42 In addition, the 
information could relate to external matters such as the trading or development plans of 
the company or its ideas for expansion as for example through takeovers and mergers.43  
  
Poor information dissemination on the stock market affects securities prices.  
‘According to the efficient capital market hypothesis, all available information about a 
company’s financial prospects is fully and virtually instantaneously reflected in the 
market price of the company’s securities.’44 Information asymmetry in the market results 
where there is uneven distribution of information among the market participants, some 
being more informed than others. It has been suggested that asymmetries introduces the 
possibility of profitable manipulation.45  Corporate insiders are usually more informed or 
have quick access to information than outsiders.  Those investors with very little 
information are referred to as noise traders. What insider traders do is to deal in price 
sensitive information which is not yet in the public domain to make profits or avoid 
losses.   
 
Prior information in the possession of corporate insiders about public release of a 
company’s earnings, dividends, bond ratings, mergers, takeovers, and bankruptcies offer 
fertile grounds for insider trading activities.  In addition announcement around major 
corporate events such as rights offer and release of information about results of research 
and development activities also create opportunities for insider trading. 
 
Insider trading occurs when persons entrusted with the management of the corporation 
trade on non public price-sensitive information about the company’s activities to make a 
gain or avoid a loss at the expense of shareholders.  The inadequacy of the common law 
to deal with insider trading problem led to the legislature to enact laws to regulate it.  
However, not everyone agrees to its regulation.  The debate rages on.  
 
The arguments in favour of insider trading are discussed in chapter 2.  
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                                       CHAPTER 2 
 
            ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE REGULATION                          
            OF INSIDER TRADING 
 
Advocates of insider trading deregulation argue that there is nothing wrong with it and 
they claim its overall impact is positive. The various arguments raised in favour of 
insider trading are discussed below.    
 
2.1   EFFICIENT AND LEGITIMATE MEANS OF COMPENSATION 
 
Henry Manne denounced the notion of inherent unfairness of insider trading 40 years 
ago and argued that insider trading does not harm investors and can indeed be an 
efficient way of compensating insiders when they enhance an issuer’s stock price.46 
Numerous studies, such as by Dye, and Carlton and Fischel among others also conclude 
that insider trading may be a way for firms to compensate management optimally.47 
Manne and others argue that by allowing insider trading it will provide the insiders with 
an incentive to innovation for developing new products or strategic plans to increase 
productivity.  They argue that permitting insider trading; the interests of the insiders will 
be aligned with that of the company. The corporate insiders may find it beneficial to 
enhance corporate risk taking thereby developing growth opportunities which will 
increase the value of shares of the company and in turn will benefit the shareholders.   
 
The argument that insider trading provides a powerful incentive for corporate officers 
for creative and entrepreneurial activity has been criticized as flawed, since a person 
who benefits from trading on inside information is not necessarily the person responsible 
for innovation.48 ‘[I]nsider trading does not necessarily reward that person in proportion 
to the value of any innovation; and insider trading allows insiders to profit from trading 
in anticipation of corporate failures as well as corporate successes. Moreover, the 
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possibility of earning profits from insider trading may encourage corporate insiders to 
withhold information from the market so as to serve the insider’s trading interests. The 
result would be that the market is misinformed and to the extent of that misinformation, 
inefficient.’49 Where insider trading is permitted, there will be a temptation for those 
responsible for ensuring prompt disclosure of price-sensitive information to delay its 
disclosure and manipulate it to their advantage before disclosing it to the public.   
 
Proponents argue that by permitting insider trading the company will be able to cut 
down on expenditure by paying lower remuneration formally to directors, managers and 
other corporate employees in the form of salary and bonuses. This it is believed will be a 
set off against the profit made by the insiders. However, this argument fails to address 
the critical issues of corporate insiders exposing the company to danger of threats of 
takeover bids by undertaking risky or ill-advised business activities involving 
investment and production decisions to destabilize the firm’s performance to take 
advantage of stock price oscillations in order to make unfair profits at the expense of 
shareholders. It also ignores the practical reality that insider trading damages investor 
confidence in securities trading, which is an important component of the proper 
functioning of the stock market.50 
 
It has been argued that if permitting insider trading is to work as suggested by its 
proponents then there must be a direct and consistent link between the profits reaped by 
the insider traders and the performance that benefits the corporation.51 However, there 
are situations whereby insider traders may profit from trading on inside information 
without any benefit accruing to the company; suggesting that permitting insider trading 
will not necessarily serve as an incentive for improved performance and link the 
interests of directors, managers and employees to the company as whole.  It is usually 
assumed by proponents of insider trading that the easiest way to profit on inside 
information is to create it by adding value to the company’s productive activities.52 This 
requires a significant investment of time and energy on the part of the insider to generate 
new information in order to profit from inside trading. It is argued that it would be 
equally profitable and far easier for the insider to start a rumour that the company has a 
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new product or about to announce a deal and trade on such information rather than 
actually inventing a new product.53  This “invention” of information and stock 
manipulation will not benefit the company and the society at large.  
 
Proponents of insider trading often regard information creation as positive such as 
making a new deal or that an important new customer has been acquired, that there will 
be an unanticipated takeover bid or acquisition, developing a new product or that there 
has been a significant technological breakthrough and finding a new and efficient way of 
conducting business in which case permitting insider trading will serve as an incentive 
for insiders to work harder for the good of the company.54  However, insiders can also 
trade and profit on negative information such an impending large law suit against the 
firm that is likely to reduce significantly the firm’s value, an unsafe or poor quality 
product withdrawal from the market and lower than expected performance or the 
cancellation of an important contract.55  Thus, both negative and positive corporate 
information can be valuable to an insider trader. Seemingly, where insider trading is 
allowed, positive information encourages insiders to perform acts which are beneficial to 
the company and by analogous reasoning negative information would encourage 
harmful acts. Consequently, permitting insiders to profit from harms to the company 
decreases the incentive to avoid such harms.   
 
‘Even if negative or false information did not pose problems, the incentive argument for 
insider trading overlooks the difficulties posed by “free riders” ─ those who do not 
actually contribute to the creation of the information, but who nevertheless aware of it 
and can profit by trading on it.  It is a commonplace of economic theory that if persons 
can benefit from a good without paying for it, they will generally do so. If there is no 
way to exclude those who do not “pay” from enjoying a benefit, no one will have an 
incentive to pay for it, and the good will not be supplied. In the case of insider trading, 
an employee’s contribution to the creation of positive information constitutes the 
“payment.”  Unless those who do not contribute can be excluded from trading on it, 
there will be no incentive to produce the desired information; it will not get created at 
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all.’56  Excluding non-contributors will not only be costly but will in practice restrict 
insider trading and defeat the very intentions of the proponents of insider trading. 
 
Martin and Peterson argue that corporate executives should not be allowed to trade on 
inside information because they earn higher salaries.57 In addition if higher corporate 
profitability results, executives who are paid relative to performance receive greater 
remuneration via stock options and other bonuses.58 Moreover, the cost of allowing non-
disclosure of material information exceeds the benefit of increased incentive to produce 
the information.59 
 
 Insider trading has the potential of exposing the company to financial difficulties, fraud 
and even corporate failure.  This has implications for corporate governance.  Good 
corporate governance plays a vital role in underpinning the integrity and efficiency of 
financial markets.60 Companies with track record of good corporate governance and 
performance are able to attract capital from investors.  So do countries with good 
corporate governance systems in place are able to attract capital from foreign investors.   
Therefore, allowing insider trading with the view to compensating insiders will create 
inefficiencies in the corporate environment and the financial system of a country’s 
economy.    
      
2.2 OPTIMAL DISCLOSURE AND INFORMATIONALLY EFFICIENT 
STOCK PRICES 
 
Information plays an important role in an economy.  It assists in driving the pricing 
mechanism essential to economic efficiency.61  ‘When market prices incorporate all 
relevant information, the market allocates resources optimally and corporate managers 
make efficient production decisions.’62 Companies generate a lot of information as they 
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carry on with their business activities.  The information produced is a commodity, and 
which can be bargained for within the market structure.  ‘Information is gathered only 
when it is cost effective to do so, i.e., when its market value exceeds its cost of 
production. To capture this value, the producer of the information must restrict its 
availability.’63 Therefore various mechanisms are put in place by companies in the 
management of their information systems.  
 
The extent to which information is made available on the market influences the degree 
of economic efficiency.  The more information is available the greater the economic 
efficiency. ‘Market participants have no incentive to produce information unless they are 
allowed to profit from its production. This profit is a transaction cost, undermining 
economic efficiency.’64 Companies produce information to profit from it.  Corporate 
insiders may gather information in the course of performance and fulfilling their duties 
regardless of potential trading profits. It is argued that where insider trading is allowed, 
insiders will be motivated to gather more new information in order to profit from.65 This 
it is suggested will contribute to complete, instantaneous and more information been 
made available on the market. Ausubel writes: 
 
         [I]f insiders are permitted to trade freely on their private information, then information                               
           becomes more rapidly reflected in securities prices.  Insider trading thus contributes to               
           efficient markets and so to allocational efficiency, as proper capital-asset pricing leads to                
           the optimal allocation of capital resources. 66                                                                                  
 
However, there is a contrasting view which contends that insiders withhold and 
manipulate information in order to cash in thereby distorting market efficiency.67   
‘Because trading profits depend on control over information, there is no guarantee that 
the originators of successful projects will reap the rewards. Indeed, insider trading might 
be expected to induce a variety of perverse behaviours by managers who would compete 
to acquire and hoard information within the firm.’68 
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Public companies listed on the stock market are expected to disclose certain information 
timeously as stipulated in the listing requirements of the particular stock exchange and 
in the company’s articles of association.  For example, section 9 of the JSE  Listing 
Requirements stipulates that certain transactions, principally acquisitions and disposals, 
by issuers must publish an announcement of the details of such transactions as soon as 
possible after its terms have been agreed by the parties to the transactions.69  This is to 
ensure all market participants have equal access to relevant information about the 
securities of the company, prevent insider trading and maintain efficient operation of the 
market.                                                          
 
It has been argued that complete disclosure would not be optimal as information 
disclosure is costly and sometimes the costs outweigh the benefits of the increased 
disclosure.70  Shareholders value the ability of managers to control and effectively 
communicate information to the stock market.  Proponents of insider trading contend 
that ‘[i]nsider trading serves as a means of communicating market information, which 
makes markets more efficient’.71 Insiders might have access to the privileged 
information because of their position in the company. When insiders trade in securities 
on the secondary market, they speed up the flow of information and feed their 
knowledge into prices, thereby making market more efficient.72 If insider trading is 
permitted and insiders with fore knowledge trade in the securities of their company, it 
will signal to outsiders observing the price movements to infer that the insiders are 
optimistic about the company’s future prospects and may in turn buy shares which may 
cause the price move in a certain direction.73  In this way, the insider trading activity 
would have caused the price movement in the direction of their correct levels without 
disclosing sensitive information.  Thus, a company can use insider trading as a tool of 
communicating changes in fortunes to the market.  
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 If, for example, insiders such as the Chief Executive Officer and the Chairman of a 
large public listed company buy large quantity of shares at a go or as intermittent 
purchases through their brokers and the information filters through to other brokers it 
will portray as an evidence of possible rise in the company’s share price in the short run.  
Similarly, if they sell their shares in the same manner, it will give an impression of 
possible decline in the share prices in the near future.  This is likely to generate a chain 
reaction and cause share prices to move closer to its true market value without the need 
for public announcement as the market reacts immediately.  McGee and Block contend 
that, even if the insider is anonymous, an increase or decrease in demand for the 
securities in question will be noticed by the market and the price movement will respond 
accordingly.74 Prohibiting insider trading will therefore prevent this flow of information.  
It is argued that there may be valid reasons why at times companies cannot disclose 
information about their future earning prospects and other privileged information 
especially if it will harm the company.      
 
Information asymmetry exists on the market where there is unequal access to 
information for all market participants. Corporate insiders have access to more 
information than outside investors. Insider trading as a result of information asymmetry 
therefore causes disparity of power in trading among buyers and sellers of securities. 
This has the potential of causing distortions in efficient operations of capital markets.75 
Information asymmetry increases the risks assumed by the less informed party and this 
has the tendency creating a warping effect on utility functions.  
 
Manove asserts that even when insider trading is informative and could be a channel of 
communicating information; it would often be preferable if insider information were 
communicated directly to the public rather than through the stock market.76 For example 
headline news such as “XYZ Discovers Large Deposits of Petroleum to Meet Needs of 
the Country for 30 years” may be a more efficient way of communicating information to 
the investing public than an unexplained rise in the price of the securities of the firm 
through the trading activities of insiders.     
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It is better for companies to disclose relevant information to investors rather than 
allowing insiders to trade for the information to reflect in the securities prices. If insider 
trading is permitted, insiders may withhold information and distort market efficiency.   
 
2.3   INSIDER TRADING LAWS INEFFECTIVE AND DIFFICULT TO  
        ENFORCE. 
 
Globalization and technological advances have facilitated internationalization of capital 
markets, but they also present new opportunities for insider trading, thus expanding the 
need for effective regulation.77 Opponents of the prohibition of insider trading argue that 
insider trading legislation is ineffective and difficult to enforce.78 The regulation of 
insider trading has had little impact on securities market.79  Existing laws on insider 
trading require insiders either to abstain from trading on confidential information or to 
release such information to the public before they trade. It is argued that insider trading 
is inherently difficult to investigate as well proving such insider trading cases and as a 
result significant amount of clearly illegal activity goes undetected or unpunished.80 
‘Insider trading is an extraordinary crime to prove.  The underlying act of buying and 
selling securities is, of course legal activity.  It is only what is in the mind of the trader 
that can make this legal activity a prohibited act of insider trading.’81  
 
The prosecution of insider trading offence was not very common until the second half of 
the last century.82  In the USA,‘[b]etween 1966 and 1980 the SEC filed only thirty seven 
cases of insider trading, and twenty-five of them were settled out of court; that is an 
average of 2.6 cases per year, and the SEC sought or obtained disgorgement of profits in 
twelve of these.’83  The reported cases pursued by the SEC figures increased in the 
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1980’s with the tightening of regulation laws. However, it was reported that despite the 
SEC’s efforts to curtail insider trading, there was evidence to suggest active insider 
trading and insider trading profits were excessive relative to the average market return.84 
 
In the UK, Criminal Justice Act 1993, sections 52-64 makes insider dealing in shares on 
a regulated market or through professional intermediary a criminal offence punishable 
with up to seven years imprisonment. Companies and other legal persons cannot be 
guilty of insider dealing under this Act but individual directors or officers of listed 
companies who procure the offence or encourage the company to do so commit a 
criminal offence.   Legal persons such as companies are exempted the rational being an 
acknowledgement of the fact that it will be difficult to implement the legislation and 
proof insider trading without making it onerous for companies to comply.  For example 
difficulties arise when one department of a corporate body (eg a merchant bank) has 
non-public price-sensitive information about a client and another department without the 
information deals in the securities of that client. It is a single legal person and therefore 
criminally liable. But it may put up a defence of having ‘Chinese Wall’, an internal 
arrangement which satisfies the legislative requirements to ensure that no inside 
information is communicated between the department  dealing in the securities on behalf 
of the company and the department possessing the inside information. It will be no 
breach of insider trading offence if the legal requirements are met. 
 
On the monitoring, enforcement and prosecution there has been few convictions under 
the UK insider dealing legislation. 85 However, it has been argued that the relatively 
small number of convictions since 1980 is not a failure of the legislation in curbing 
insider dealing. Rather, it is regarded as having played an important part in changing 
attitudes to the proper use of information, with the effect that insider dealing is seen 
universally as wrong, which was not the case when it was first made illegal in 1980.86  
 
In South Africa, there hasn’t been any conviction for insider trading offences.87 Is it 
confirming the long viewed perception that insider trading laws are ineffective or overly 
legalistic and extremely difficult to obtain a conviction? It has been reported that a 
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change of attitude towards insider trading as being unacceptable has contributed to the 
low incidence of insider trading in South Africa.88 ‘Insider trading is no longer a hip in 
SA. That’s according to a new report by the Insider Trading Directorate (ITD), which 
surveyed a range of the country’s financial and legal firms and found that 80% felt that 
insider trading had become markedly less acceptable. The survey included actively 
traded listed companies, member firms of the JSE Securities Exchange, asset 
management companies, and corporate finance, audit and law firms.  It aimed to assess 
the impact of anti-insider trading measures taken since South Africa’s Insider Trading 
Act took effect in January 1999. “The new regime has changed prevailing attitudes to 
insider trading, resulted in new policies and approaches among listed corporates and 
their advisers, and – according to most market participants – led to a sharp reduction in 
the perceived incidence of insider trading”, said ITD chair Rob Barrow.’89 
 
Successful prosecution of insider trading cases are few because of the inherent difficulty 
in obtaining evidence and proving the mens rea for the crime.   
 
2.4   VICTIMLESS 
 
Proponents of insider trading deregulation argue that insider trading is a victimless act 
and that enforcing insider trading prohibitions is simply not cost effective; the amount of 
money which is recovered does not justify the money spent on investigating and 
prosecuting insider traders.90  According to this point of view, buying and selling of 
securities is a consensual act which the parties to the transaction agree to trade with no 
prior contract to have access to equal information nor which require a party to refrain 
from trading if equal knowledge is not possessed. Thus, asymmetric information should 
not be a basis of illegality in a trade involving a willing buyer and a willing seller.    
 
In equities trading, it may be true to some extent that public shareholders’ transactions 
would have taken place whether or not an insider was unlawfully trading in the market.91 
It could be argued that since the traders willingly accept to take the risk that the party on 
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the other side of the trade is more knowledgeable, no one’s rights are violated.  ‘If no 
one’s rights are violated, the act is not unjust; if someone’s rights are violated the act is 
unjust.’92 This raises the obvious question of whose rights are violated by insider 
trading.   
 
McGee and Block points out that the obvious potential victims of insider trading are the 
potential sellers who sell their stock anonymously to an insider trader but discount that 
they would have sold anyway whether the inside trader bought from them or not; in 
which case it does not affect the proceeds they receive.93 They argue that it is difficult to 
measure any damage done to the sellers if the sellers are hurt at all by having an inside 
trader in the market.94 ‘In fact, academic literature recognizes that insider trading does 
not result in any harm to any identifiable group, and those who sell to inside traders may 
actually be helped rather than harmed because they receive a better price.’95 They argue 
that since there appears to be no violation of anyone’s rights in such instances of insider 
trading, it will appear illogical to allow for anyone to sue for damages.96  
 
Trading in options market presents a different scenario; in that professional option 
writers write options only in response to a particular demand.  If the demand is made by 
an insider possessing price-sensitive non-public information, the option writer suffers a 
loss that would not have occurred.97                                                                          
 
Outside investors as a group, it is argued stand to lose. ‘The losses of outside group are 
caused by the fact that insiders take advantage of price movements.  If a group of traders 
participated equally in all price moves, the group would perform as well as the market.  
Insiders, however, cause outsiders as group to hold less stock before price rises and 
more before price drops.  An example may clarify how outsiders lose as much as 
insiders gain.  Assume a firm with a total capitalization of $100, $90 of which are held 
by outsiders and $10 by insiders.  Insiders, predicting a price drop, sell $5 of their 
holdings, resulting in their holding of $5 for the outsiders’ $95.  Insiders’ expectations 
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materialize and the market falls 20%, leaving outsiders with 95% of $80, or $76, and 
insiders with $4.’98 
 
Employers are harmed by insider trading when corporate employees misappropriate 
information for personal financial gains. As a result they become victims of insider 
trading. In this circumstance if the perpetrator could be identified, then the company will 
have recourse at law to sue the employee. Since it is a private right violation and not a 
public harm it would appear illogical for the government to be a party to the suit 
involving insider trading.99  
  
It seems to suggest that the primary victims of insider trading are outsiders who traded 
with insiders and remedies should be limited to privity of contract.  However, traders 
and secondary victims on the stock market are diverse and dispersed. The fact that one 
person is not specifically harmed in trading on the stock market does not mean that the 
broader society is not harmed. The practice of insider trading is regarded as a fraud on 
the market.  When people suspect insider trading is rife, they may lose confidence and 
invest less in the market or leave the market.100 This will have the effect of reducing the 
market size and depriving companies the opportunity of raising capital to fund future 
expansion projects. Ultimately the reduced market size harms everyone in the market 
and the society in general.101  ‘The reduced size of the market will have a number of 
harmful effects, including (a) a decline in the liquidity of stocks because it is harder to 
find buyers and sellers for stock; (b) an increase in the variability of stock prices because 
small variations will make relatively larger differences in the smaller market; (c) a 
decline in the market’s ability to spread risk because there are fewer parties among 
whom to spread risks; (d) a decline in market efficiency due to the reduced number of 
buyers and sellers; and (e) a decline in the utility gains available to traders because of 
the decline in available traders.’102 
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Insider trading also has the harmful effect of increasing transaction costs in the course of 
buying and selling of securities.103 Trading in securities on the stock market is done 
through intermediaries such as merchant banks and other stockbrokers who charge a fee 
for their services. Some buy and hold their stocks for sale to those who may want to buy 
later. When insiders dispose off their securities to the intermediaries which turn out to be 
worthless, a natural consequence is for the intermediary to raise his fees in future trades 
to cover the losses and this makes it costly to trade in securities.  In an extreme case, the 
costs may rise so high to the extent that the market in a stock breaks down completely or 
in a less extreme case the rising costs will merely make the stock market just much more 
inefficient.104 Insider trading undermines the proper functioning of the markets and 
harms all those who have a direct or indirect interest in the efficiency of the markets. 
This involves everyone as trading on the stock market affects our lives in one way or the 
other. 
 
External costs emanating from loss of investor confidence as a result of unchecked 
insider trading can affect the economy by keeping away foreign investors thereby 
depriving it the much needed foreign investment. The state has an important role to play 
in protecting the proper functioning of the capital market.  Large volumes of transactions 
takes place in a day’s trading on the securities exchange which goes through a 
complicated computer-assisted electronic trading system. Therefore it will be difficult to 
link up buyers and sellers to address issues of civil liability.  If it were possible to link 
up who sold securities to whom on the securities exchange, becoming a competent 
claimant would be a little bit like winning a lottery.105  Rider contends that law is the 
proper tool for protecting the proper functioning of markets whether in securities or 
other forms of property.106  It is argued that insider trading harms the society’s overall 
utilities and prevents the goal of involving more people in the “ownership of society”.  
 
The regulation of insider trading started in the United States after the stock market crash 
in 1929.  The regulation spread to other parts of the world. Over the years, the 
arguments against the prohibition of insider trading have been put forward but haven’t 
succeeded in convincing various jurisdictions to deregulate insider trading. Today, most 
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countries around the world with financial markets have legislation prohibiting insider 
trading suggesting that the arguments against insider trading are not good enough to 
warrant deregulation.  The arguments for prohibiting insider trading are discussed in 
chapter 3.                                 
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                                                            CHAPTER 3 
 
     ARGUMENTS FOR PROHIBITION OF INSIDER TRADING  
 
Insider trading is prohibited on most stock markets around the world. ‘The goal of 
securities regulation in general, and insider trading regulation in particular, is to promote 
full and fair disclosure and create transparent capital markets.’107 Insider trading 
prohibition has traditionally been justified on the grounds that it offends basic notions of 
fairness and jeopardizes the integrity of the capital markets. Bollen asserts that the basis 
of the prohibition of insider trading in most international regimes comprises one of the 
following: market efficiency, fairness, fiduciary duty and misappropriation.108 The 
various arguments advanced to justify the prohibition of insider trading are discussed 
below. 
 
3.1 MARKET EFFICIENCY  
 
The prohibition based on the premise that insider trading is damaging to the efficient 
operation of the financial market. The market efficiency concept largely based on 
market price firm’s stock, how securities prices react to new information and aggregate 
social welfare.  The financial theory called the efficient capital market hypothesis has 
been a useful tool for analysis. The theory has been used somewhat differently, but in its 
most widely accepted form holds that, when a competitive market exists for securities, 
all public information about prospects for the firm will be fully and virtually 
instantaneously reflected in the market price of the securities.109   Put differently, the 
efficient market theory posits that the prices of securities in financial markets should 
reflect all available information. ‘An efficient securities market is one in which the price 
of a stock at a given time is the best estimate of what the price will be in the future.  In it 
weakest form, it says that nothing in the sequence of past stock prices enables investors 
to predict future price movements; the semi-strong form asserts that all publicly 
available information about issuers is reflected in stock prices, whereas according to the 
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strong form, even non public information is translated into the prices. In an efficient 
market, public announcements will immediately affect the price of a security.  In order 
to achieve maximum efficiency, the most prompt disclosure possible of material 
information is therefore necessary.’110                                                            
                                                                                                                                                 
An efficient market will be transparent and this will enable all market participants to 
have equal access to relevant information about the securities of a company to analyze 
and take rational decisions for their investments.  Securities regulation laws are intended 
to facilitate the dissemination of all relevant information to assist in the determination of 
the market price of securities. However, in practice not all material information are 
disclosed and information required to be supplied almost always lags behind significant 
new information about a publicly traded company.111 There has been a decline in the 
influence of the efficient market theory as a determinant of stock price and it is now 
recognized that stock prices are at best, only a very rough indicator of full economic 
value of a company’s shares.112  
 
The stock market efficiency concept has two components, namely, the speed and 
accuracy with which information about the securities of a company gets to the market 
and reflected in its prices.113 ‘The more efficiently information about a security is 
reflected in price, the more efficient the market for that security is thought to be.’114 It is 
unclear the extent to which information quickly becomes public with or without insider 
trading. What is clear though, is that market prices are more accurate once the 
information is released.115 Securities prices move up and down as new, unexpected 
information enters the market. However, some types of information that are highly 
relevant to assessing the economic value of the securities of companies appear to be 
incorporated into prices far more slowly and incompletely than the conventional view of 
market efficiency would suggest.                                                                                      
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An example of an apparently incomplete and delayed response of market prices to new 
information is the “post-earnings-announcement-drift” that occurs when a company 
announces an unanticipated increase in earnings, which tend to be followed by abnormal 
positive returns in the firm’s stock over the next several months.116 On the other hand, 
companies that announce bad earnings news see abnormal negative returns over an 
extended period.117 This has led commentators to conclude that the initial price response 
to the new earnings information is incomplete and that the full implications of the new 
earnings information are digested by the markets far more slowly than previously 
suspected.118                                                                
 
Insiders may influence the operation of an efficient market as for example when they 
delay the disclosure of price-sensitive information in order to give themselves more time 
to trade or permitting them to implement a trading strategy to extract maximum gain 
from the use or the information.119  Macey writes:  
                  
        [I]t might be best, from the point of view of an insider with non-public positive information,                 
          to make a series of small purchases of stock (or derivative) over a relatively protracted             
          period of time in order to minimize the price impact of such purchases.  This tactic allows        
          insiders to minimize their acquisition costs by reducing the price impact of their purchases. 
          By stringing out their purchases or sales over a long period of time, insiders could minimize                            
          the effects of their purchases on average trading volume in order to impede the ability of                
         market professionals to “decode” the information being conveyed by the insider’s trading.120 
 
Insider trading may impact on market efficiency as it has an effect on the transaction 
costs market participants have to bear. Insider traders have informational advantage over 
other investors in the securities of a company. The superior information of insiders 
generates informational asymmetry on capital markets.  Asymmetric information 
increases the cost of trading. ‘[A] growing body of economic literature on market 
microstructure suggests that insider trading on non-public information might reduce 
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market liquidity.’121 Reduced market liquidity implies higher trading costs.  Exchange 
specialist and other market makers bear a transaction cost when insider dealers dispose 
off securities to them. This cost is passed on to traders or investors in the bid-asked 
spread quoted by exchange specialist and other market makers. Thus, they subsidize 
their losses vis-à-vis insider traders by charging liquidity traders an immediacy fee.122 
The fee charged is the bid-ask spread. ‘The greater the degree of asymmetric 
information, the greater the bid- ask spread (i.e., cost of trading). This logic suggests 
that, because insider trading is a type of informed trading, the greater its incidence, the 
higher are the costs of trading for uninformed investors and hence the lower is market 
liquidity.’123           
 
Investors have a rational expectation that they will earn fair returns on their investments. 
Permitting insider trading could create opportunities for exploitation of the market by 
insiders at the expense of shareholders or outside investors.  If investors have reasons to 
believe that insider trading exists and insiders having informational advantage will gain 
more at their expense, they may reduce their investment in the securities of that 
company.  Local and foreign investors as well may not participate in such markets.  The 
reduced investment will have chilling effect on the overall liquidity of financial markets 
and the ability of companies to raise capital. This will affect the allocation of resources 
and hence attainment of market efficiency.   
 
The market efficiency rationale for regulating insider trading is based on the premise 
that insider trading may damage financial markets.  Insider trading makes the market 
inefficient and raises cost of capital for issuers of securities thereby decreasing the 
overall economic growth of a country.  Therefore regulating insider trading makes the 
market efficient.  An efficient market attracts more investors, which translate into 
market liquidity and thus economic growth.   
  
3.2 FIDUCIARY DUTY 
 
Regulators of insider trading point out that corporate insider owe a fiduciary duty to  
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shareholders. The fiduciary duty theory posits that insiders, by virtue of their office or 
relationship with the company have a standing obligation to enhance the interest of the 
company and its members or shareholders.  The orthodox legal position of fiduciary 
duty in corporate governance is that directors being the principal management organ of 
the company owe fiduciary duties to the company but do not owe fiduciary duties to 
shareholders, employees, creditors or the members of any other constituency which may 
have some interest in the company’s affairs.124    
 
A corporate insider breaches a fiduciary duty by trading on inside information to make a 
profit or to avoid losses.  Where a director or employee for that matter has breached his 
fiduciary duty by using confidential information he is liable to account for the profits 
made. It is immaterial whether the company actually suffered damage or not or could 
possibly have been harmed.  The company may be entitled to institute legal action 
against the employee for breach of fiduciary duty or an action in tort for infringement of 
the company’s right to privacy. With respect to insider trading in securities of public 
listed companies, the state through the regulatory body, the SEC in the case of United 
States and in South Africa the Financial Services Board, will hold that inside trader 
accountable for civil and criminal liabilities.                                                                         
 
In re Cady Roberts & Co.,125an employee of a broking firm who was also a director of 
publicly held company, learned of the proposed reduction in impending dividends to be 
paid to shareholders by the company in his capacity as a director.  He revealed this 
information to a partner in the broking firm, who sold shares in the company on account 
of that information to several clients of the broking firm prior to the public 
announcement of the reduction in dividends. It was held that the broker violated the 
insider trading prohibition. The SEC applying the broad construction of the provisions in 
Section 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 took the view 
that the prohibitions of insider trading was founded partly on fiduciary principles, 
arguing that the relationship between an insider and a company gave him access to 
confidential information which could be used only for corporate purposes and not for the 
personal gain of anyone.  The other facet of the prohibition the SEC relied on is the 
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inherent unfairness of the insider trading with information knowing that it is unavailable 
to those with whom he is dealing.126 The Commission said: 
       
          [t]he existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended 
          to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and  
          second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information 
          knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.  In considering these elements              
          under the broad language of the anti-fraud provisions we are not to be circumscribed by the          
          fine distinctions and rigid classifications.  Thus, it is our task here to identify those persons         
          who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs, and thereby       
          suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. Intimacy demands restraint lest the      
          uninformed be exploited.127  
 
The SEC did not put much stock in duties in Cady but articulated the rationale of the 
fiduciary duty. It adopted the disclose or abstain rule, that those in possession of material 
non-public information must disclose it before trading or abstain from trading until the 
information is made public.  It was held that, since the defendant had obtained the 
information from a business partner who is an insider, the defendant shared in the 
insider’s abstain or disclose obligation.                                                                                               
         
In a later case, SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Company,128 a federal circuit endorsed the 
application of disclose or abstain duty from trading to anyone in possession of material 
information. The directors and officers of a mining company were held liable for profits 
they made as a result of trading on undisclosed information as to the discovery of 
mining deposits.                                        
 
In 1959 Texas Gulf Sulphur Company exploratory prospecting surveying equipment 
detected and produced some evidence of existence of valuable deposits of copper, zinc 
and silver in an area of Ontario, Canada. The first drilling took place in 1963 which 
confirmed the existence of enormous valuable commercial quantities. Tight control 
measures were put in place by the company to keep this information confidential and 
prevent any leakage of information to outsiders.  Meanwhile, corporate insiders 
comprising of various officers, directors and employees exploited the situation bought 
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shares and call options of Texas Gulf Sulphur Company or obtained stock options and 
tipped other people to purchase stock or options of the company. During this period, the 
stock prices of the company were relatively low.   
  
Rumours were circulating about the company’s discovery of the minerals and the stock 
price rose from $17.375 to $29.375 on November 10, 1963. Eventually, the company 
made a public announcement of the discovery on April 16, 1964 and the stock price 
jumped to $71 on April 19, 1964.  Substantial profits were made by those who had 
purchased the stock or acquired stock options of the company prior to the public 
announcement. In April 1965, the SEC filed a suit against a number of directors, 
managers and employees as individual defendants for violating Rule 10b-5 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by purchase and sale of securities on the basis non-
public material information, making available such information directly or indirectly to 
other persons to trade or deal in the securities of Texas Gulf Sulphur Company while the 
information remains confidential and engaging in other conduct of similar purport and 
object.  The SEC won the case in that the conduct of the defendants was found to impair 
the integrity of the market which is the target of Rule 10b-5.    
 
The court’s approach placed emphasis on access to information, that investors in a 
market should have an equal opportunity to obtain and evaluate information relevant to 
trading decisions.  In noting the essence of Rule 10b-5 was to ensure that all persons 
trading on the securities market should have relatively equal access to material 
information and be subjected to the same market conditions, Judge Waterman stated: 
 
       ‘Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the                       
         investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate            
         confidence, or he chooses not to do so, he must abstain from trading in recommending                         
         the securities concerned while such information is undisclosed.’129  
 
Thus, the duty to disclose information, however, seem not to be an absolute one, but an 
alternative one, that of either disclosing or abstaining from trading. The disclosure of 
material information to the investing public is incumbent on the company and whilst the 
information remains confidential, an insider must abstain from dealing in it.  It will be 
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breach of fiduciary duty if the insider discloses corporate confidential information 
before trading.       
 
The obligation to disclose or abstain from trading as set out in the Supreme Court 
decision in Chiarella v United States,130 is based on fiduciary duty. Vincent Chiarella 
was a worker in a financial printing company who received information by reading 
printing jobs and figured out the names of the acquisition target firms of the printing 
company and bought stocks of the target firms prior to public announcements. He was 
charged by the SEC for committing insider trading offences. The court held that he was 
not liable for insider trading because he owed no fiduciary duty to those with whom he 
traded; the acquisition target firms and in the absence of a relationship of trust or 
confidence, he had not contravened Rule 10b-5.   
 
Chiarella was not found liable for insider trading neither as a primary insider or a 
secondary insider, commonly referred to as ‘tippee’ (receivers of second-hand 
information).  The majority of the court held that the misappropriation theory was not 
available to found conviction in the case as it was not properly presented to the jury.131 
The U.S. Supreme Court in casu left open whether Rule 10b-5 would be contravened 
where an insider who misappropriated and traded on information obtained from another 
if the insider was not under fiduciary obligation either to the issuer of the securities or to 
the other party to the trade. However, subsequent cases by appeal courts there under 
have adopted the misappropriation theory. The theory encompasses and extends the 
fiduciary duty to the extent that the owner of the information may not necessarily be the 
issuer of the securities.  
 
The policy underlying the fiduciary duty obligation is to prevent any temptation which 
the fiduciary may succumb to when faced with the opportunity of preferring his own 
interests over and above those of the company or beneficiary. They are also intended to 
protect the institution of agency, integrity of commercial organizations and public 
interest or the society at large.  Fiduciary duties are made absolute and strictly applied 
by the courts irrespective of whether the company or beneficiary suffered a loss or not. 
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‘Statutory definitions of what constitutes an “insider” for the purposes of insider trading 
laws may be based on either a “person connection” approach or an “information 
connection” approach.  The “person connection” approach defines “insider” by 
reference to the relationship of the person to the public issuer of securities, while the 
“information connection” approach considers anyone who has material price-sensitive 
information about the issuer to be an insider, regardless of his or her relationship to the 
issuer.’132 In some jurisdictions such as Japan, Hong Kong and China, insider trading 
law uses a person connection approach in its definition of insider whilst others such as 
Australia have to a varying degree amended their definitions of insider to reflect the 
information connection approach.133 ‘United States, although the first country to address 
the issue of insider trading, lacks a statutory definition of “insider” and instead relies on 
generally applicable laws against securities fraud.  It has developed a definition with 
elements of both approaches.’134  
 
With regards to insider trading legislation, explanations based on the fiduciary duty 
theory, in a narrow context restricts the scope of the duty to corporate insiders which 
requires a person to have a relationship with the issuer of the securities or the company 
that holds the information. Thus, the duty is given a person connection to corporation 
approach in order for someone to be considered as an insider.  It is argued that the 
insiders are agents of the corporation engaging in a prohibited insider trades obtain their 
information via fiduciary relationships, and trading on this information for personal gain 
is a breach of that duty.135  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
When dealing with the principal the agent is required to disclose all material facts. It 
would be unfair for the agent to profit by dealing with an uninformed principal as the 
agent is already compensated.  It is argued by regulators that the insiders acquired the 
information in their capacity as fiduciaries of the shareholders, and thus may not use it in 
dealings with the shareholders.136 ‘If insider trading is permitted, the shareholders will 
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either demand a premium to compensate for the risks imposed or will expend resources 
policing management.’ 137 Therefore, prohibiting insider trading prevents a costly breach 
of fiduciary duty.  It is to be noted that whatever distinctions that existed based on the 
common law view that an officer or director stand in a fiduciary relationship only to 
existing shareholders from whom he purchases securities but not to the investors to 
whom he deals, is not appropriate in the securities market.                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                                                    
In Chiarella v United States,138 the court held the trader’s fiduciary duty was the basis of 
his violation of the insider trading prohibition and this was reaffirmed in Dirks v SEC.139 
Dirks was a securities analyst and received inside information from employees of a 
company that the company was engaged in a massive fraud. He acted on this 
information by alerting his clients to sell their securities in the company.  The employees 
acted not for personal gain but with the intent to expose fraud. The US Supreme Court 
held that corporate insiders owed fiduciary duty to shareholders and must either disclose 
material inside information or not to trade in the securities of the company.140 The Court 
further held that a tippee, who receives material non-public information from an insider 
and trades on it violates Rule 10b-5 and is liable if he knew or had reason to believe that 
the insider had breached a fiduciary duty in disclosing the confidential information. 
Dirks was not held liable for trading on inside information because the disclosure of the 
information was for the purpose of exposing fraud and not for personal gain. His tippee 
also escaped liability and nobody was liable for insider trading violation as the 
disclosures of the information was to expose fraud. 
 
The decision in Dirks was quite significant regarding analyst liability for insider trading, 
tippees liability and the development of the concept of “constructive insiders.” The 
decision in the case suggests that a primary insider violates his fiduciary duty or Rule 
10b-5 only if he is seeking personal benefit. Under US law a primary insider are 
directors, corporate officers and controlling shareholders.  “Temporary” or “constructive 
insiders” are outsiders who legitimately receive confidential information from a 
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corporation in the course of providing services to the corporation such as lawyers, 
consultants, accountants and investment bankers.141                                         
 
Constructive insiders may become privy to inside information and acquire fiduciary 
duties provided the corporation expected the constructive insider to keep the information 
confidential.142 Thus, constructive insiders become liable since they acquire the 
fiduciary duties of a true insider.  Under normal circumstances financial analysts are not 
considered as temporary insiders since they are receivers of secondary information. As a 
result they come within the definition of secondary insiders under US law.143The 
secondary insider becomes liable for breaching fiduciary duty only if he knows or has 
reason to believe that the primary insider is breaching a duty by providing the 
information. 
 
In practice the “personal benefit” standard of liability espoused in Dirks has proved 
confusing and difficult to apply.144 The SEC and the courts seemed to have taken an 
expansive view of the personal benefit test to impose a fiduciary duty. It has been argued 
that corporate insiders have been found to be in breach of their duties by seeking 
intangible, reputation benefits or making gifts of confidential information. 145 
 
The fiduciary duty theory has limitations and has been regarded by some commentators 
as not providing adequate justification for some aspects of insider trading law violations. 
‘It does not cover persons who are privy to similar valuable information, as those in the 
traditional fiduciary relationship, but who have other relationships with the company.’ 
It is argued that if insider trading is based on breach of fiduciary duty which is private as 
between employer and employee, then it could be modified by parties to the relationship 
to exclude the duty and permit insider trading. Such a privatised arrangement of insider 
trading will have a negative impact on maintaining the integrity of fair and efficient 
capital markets.146 However, in most jurisdictions, legislation prohibiting insider trading 
makes the fiduciary duty rationale mandatory.  Imposition of fiduciary theory is 
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necessary to ensure that insiders do not abuse their position of trust for personal 
enrichment. 
 
3.3 MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY       
 
 Information is a property that can be owned and traded. A company’s confidential 
information is its property and has an exclusive right of its use.  If the information is 
“misappropriated” (or stolen) by someone else then it is tantamount to fraud akin to 
embezzlement. The misappropriation theory depicts that it is wrong for someone else to 
use non-public price-sensitive information other than the owner. ‘[A]n insider who takes 
confidential inside company information and uses it to enrich himself is in effect a thief 
stealing what is not his. Like any common thief who violates the moral rights of those 
from whom he steals, the insider trader is violating the moral rights of all shareholders, 
especially those who unwittingly sell him their stock.’147 The liability of the insider 
under the misappropriation theory is premised on the notion that a person entrusted with 
non-public information breaches a fiduciary duty owed to the issuer or someone other 
than the issuer who gave the information to him to be held in confidence.148   
 
According to the misappropriation theory a person commits a fraud in connection with a 
securities transaction when he conducts such a transaction using confidential 
information which hasn’t been made public by the issuer or without its prior approval. 
Such transactions violate section 10(b) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and 
SEC Rule 10b-5.  Under U.S law, the courts recognize that a corporation’s information 
is its property.149      
 
‘The misappropriation theory is followed by several lower courts in the United States, 
including the influential Second Circuit Court of Appeals which sits in New York.’150 
The theory is difficult to apply and has led to conflict among courts in its application. 
Consequently, insider trading liability may vary throughout the United States.  The 
misappropriation theory has been rejected by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
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the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals the conflict in application has led to a consideration 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. 151 
 
Prior to the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by Congress, the courts 
sporadically applied the common law tort of fraud to deal with securities transactions.152 
Under the common law, fraud is committed when there is a false representation of 
material fact by means of a statement or conduct made knowingly or recklessly in order 
to gain a material advantage on which the claimant relies to his detriment.  
 
Early court decisions under the 1934 Act applied its restrictions broadly and liability by 
misrepresentation was imputed liberally.  The courts emphasized fairness and market 
integrity over the technical requirements of fraud in the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.   
 
 
In United States v Carpenter153 the U.S. Supreme Court in upholding insider trading 
conviction handed down by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the justices were  
evenly split four to four ( 4 – 4 ) in its consideration over the validity of the 
misappropriation theory. The defendant had received his information from a journalist 
rather than from the company. Had he obtained it from the company it would have been 
a breach of fiduciary duty he owed to his company by misappropriating confidential 
information for his personal gain without the owner’s permission. The misappropriation 
theory on the other hand has been used to cover a wider scope to include information 
misappropriation by other means such theft to protect persons who trade in shares, 
thereby bringing his act within the misappropriation theory prohibition.  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory of insider trading in 
United States v O’Hagan.154  The O’Hagan case grew out of Grand Metropolitan PLC’s 
(Grand Met) takeover of Pillsbury Company.  O’Hagan was a partner in a law firm 
representing Grand Met.  He was not one of the lawyers in the firm acting for Grand Met 
in this particular deal and after learning of the impending takeover bid used this inside 
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information to purchase call options on Pillsbury stock. He exercised his options 
resulting in profits of over $4 million when Grand Met publicly announced its tender 
offer. The SEC prosecuted O’Hagan with insider trading based on the misappropriation 
theory, arguing that he owed fiduciary duty to Pillsbury for using deceitful acquisition 
and misuse of information that properly belongs to it.  He was convicted on fifty-seven 
counts of securities fraud, mail fraud and money laundering.  The SEC ordered O’Hagan 
to disgorge his profits.  On appeal, a federal appeals court rejected the misappropriation 
theory but when the case went before the Supreme Court, his conviction was upheld and 
the ruling was 6-3 in favour of the SEC.                                                                                   
 
O’Hagan claimed that neither he nor his company owed a fiduciary duty to Pillsbury, so 
that he did not commit fraud by purchasing Pillsbury options. O’Hagan’s arguments 
were rejected by the court and upheld the conviction. The Court recognized that a 
corporation’s information is its property and that a person commits fraud in connection 
with a securities transaction when he uses confidential information by breaching a duty 
arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence regardless of the source of the 
information.  In upholding the conviction, the court said: 
 
The “misappropriation theory” holds that a person commits fraud “in connection with” a securities 
transaction, and thereby violates 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information 
for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.  Under this 
theory, a fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell 
securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of 
the information.  In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and 
purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-
turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.155 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
The misappropriation theory has its shortcomings which limits or overstretches its 
application. The theory presupposes that insider trading may always be regarded as 
breach of fiduciary duty or possibly the insider has stolen proprietary information.                                                                                                                             
 
‘The misappropriation theory inadequately serves the economic function of Rule 10b-5: 
the maintenance of market integrity.  In limiting its restriction to trades made on 
misappropriated non-public information, the theory prohibits only one category of 
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imbalanced market transactions. Transactions in which parties have disparate access to 
information that has been legitimately obtained by the advantaged party are permitted 
under the theory.  Economic theory suggests that this disparity itself is inefficient and 
may result in market failures. In particular, misappropriation theory cannot insure 
market integrity because the focus on particular transactions fails to address the issue of 
information asymmetry.’156                                                      
 
Furthermore, under the misappropriation theory, it would seem misappropriation is 
present only when there is a secretive use of information and there will be no breach if 
the user discloses his intent to trade in advance to the owner or source of information. It 
also suggests that if the owner approves the use of the information then the insider could 
trade with an uninformed party without any constraints, implying that employers and 
other sources can presumably authorise insider trading if they so desire.157  
 
Despite its limitations, ‘the misappropriation theory has become one of the most 
effective tools in the enforcement of the insider law.  In one sense, anyone who trades on 
non-public information could be caught by the misappropriation theory. After all, every 
insider trading case involves an unauthorised use of information. That is, 
misappropriation could occur in all insider trading cases, whether the defendant is the 
classic insider that is embraced in Chiarella, or the outsider whose fiduciary relationship 
with one company provides valuable information about a company with whom the 
defendant has no relationship.’158 
      
3.4 MARKET FAIRNESS 
 
It has been suggested that for securities markets to function properly, it is essential that 
all participants should have relatively equal access to information and those who occupy 
strategic positions in the market mechanism should be prevented from reaping benefits 
from information received by virtue of their position as it gives them an unfair 
advantage over persons with whom they deal.159                                                             
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The concept of fairness is subjective and commentators cannot agree on what the term 
really means.160 Easterbrook treats fiduciary duty as separate from the fairness 
argument.161  Bainbridge merges the concept of fiduciary duty and fairness in his 
analysis of the fairness argument.162 ‘Fairness can be defined in three principal ways: 
fairness requires that no trader breach fiduciary duty by trading; fairness requires that no 
trader possess an informational advantage; and, fairness requires that the trader not harm 
those with whom he trades.’163 Moore points out that the key feature of the fairness 
arguments is the disparity of information between two parties to a transaction and that 
trading should be on a level playing field.164                                                                                                          
 
Where there is disparity of information the field tilts towards one player and away from 
the other thereby making the transaction to be unfair. Insiders have informational 
advantage whereas other investors to the transaction lack such information and thus are 
at a disadvantage. She makes the argument that in general fairness only becomes an 
issue when one party owes a duty to disclose information to the other party with whom 
he is trading.165 Where a duty of disclosure of information is owed it suggests that 
trading on inside information is sleazy not because it violates the notion of fairness, but 
because of the breach of fiduciary duty involved. It therefore makes the effectiveness of 
the fairness argument against insider trading inconclusive and independent of the 
fiduciary duty concept.  Mitchell contends that fairness is not always a reliable principle 
on which to base a legal intervention, since the absence of implied fair dealing in 
contractual obligations means that to impose it necessitates the construction of a 
fiduciary relationship between the insider and his victim or the company whose shares 
he has dealt in.166  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
The market fairness argument is based on the proposition that all investors in the market 
should have equal access to information from an issuer of securities to enable them to 
evaluate information relevant to their trading decisions.  An insider may obtain access to 
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price-sensitive information as a result of his or her relationship with the issuer of the 
securities or a prospective bidder for those securities; or by receiving the information 
from a person who has such a relationship.167  It is argued that insiders have 
informational advantage by virtue of their position and to permit insider trading is unfair 
or unjust.168                                       
 
Unlike the information advantage of stock experts or analysts, the information advantage 
of the insider is unfair because it is unjustly stolen from the shareholders who made the 
investments that ultimately produced the information he stole.169 Securities analysts own 
the information he uses because it was produced through his own labour, resources or 
expenditure in searching to obtain that information. The insider on the other hand, his 
information advantage comes from stealing the fruits of someone else’s labour or 
resources.  
  
‘If a securities market is to be efficient, it must be properly equipped to ensure that the 
price of securities accurately reflects their value.  It might be thought that part of that 
should include the means of preventing or at least, of discouraging persons who are ‘in 
the know’ with unpublished price-sensitive information from taking unfair advantage of 
their informed position.  A “level playing-field” should be preserved, whereby 
information is promptly “made public” and “insiders” are deterred from abusing their 
position, if a modern securities market is to preserve credibility.  If that is achieved, all 
investors are then able to deal on the market on equal footing.  Everyone has equal 
access to all material information.  This is the ‘ideal’ position in what has sometimes 
been described by economists as the theory of market egalitarianism.’170 
 
Without doubt all investors trading on capital markets face some kind of a risk such as 
market volatility or unexpectedly variable share prices and the possibility of a market 
crash. The risk taken by the investors may be such that prices move against them when 
they deal.  Some market participants are more equipped or have better resources or 
expertise in the gathering of information and ability to interpret the information. Hence 
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there will always be some investors with informational advantage over others and 
market egalitarianism cannot be achieved. 
 
The market fairness approach as the basis of insider trading prohibition fails to address 
the advantage of superior skills or expertise of analyst, time, resources or commitment 
that some investors may have over others in accessing information on the market 
thereby resulting in being informational advantaged. 
 
Market fairness arguments emphasize disclosure and widespread dissemination of 
information on the market to ensure that all market participants have equal access to the 
relevant information. Regulators argue that prohibition of insider trading remove 
information asymmetry in the securities market. However, inequalities in access to 
information may exist because of inequalities in education and resources. Having better 
resources and expertise improves one’s competitiveness in the market.  The market 
fairness theory is not concerned with the superior advantage one investor may have over 
another investor.  Instead it targets the insider and prevents him from using his 
informational advantage over other investors or market participants and this is desirable 
for the securities market.  
 
Arguments for the deregulation of insider trading are unconvincing. Permitting insider 
trading with the view to compensate the agents for innovation and entrepreneurship will 
lead to conflict of interest.  Insiders will look after their interest at the expense of the 
shareholders.  Investors have reasonable expectation for rise in the value of their 
investment and economic growth.  Insiders can use inside information to manipulate the 
securities market, making it inefficient and damage investor confidence in the market. 
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                                              CHAPTER 4   
 
          INSIDER TRADING: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
Insider trading occurs when there is dealing in securities or financial instruments by a 
person knowingly in possession of inside information, relating to the instrument being 
dealt in.171 Being subversive of the efficient functioning of and undermines investor 
confidence in financial markets, it is outlawed internationally.172 Variations exist in the 
legislation enacted by various countries to prohibit insider trading. This chapter 
examines the insider trading regulation in South Africa. The current legislation 
prohibiting insider trading is contained in chapter VIII of the Securities Services Act 36 
of 2004 (the Act) which came into effect on February 1, 2005. The Financial Services 
Board (FSB) is the regulatory body appointed to oversee the regulation of insider trading 
with the aid of the courts. In addition the JSE Securities Exchange (JSE) and the 
Securities Regulation Panel (SRP) play an important role in regulating insider trading in 
South Africa. The JSE regulates insider trading through its Listing Requirements and in 
the case of the SRP through its Code on Mergers and Takeovers.  
 
4.1 WHAT IS INSIDE INFORMATION? 
 
Inside information is defined in Section 72 of the Act as: 
 
       ‘……..specific or precise information, which has not been made public and which─ 
(a) is obtained or learned as an insider; and 
(b) if it were made public would be likely to have a material effect on the price or value  
of any security listed on a regulated market. 
 
For a person to be caught by the insider trading prohibition, the following elements of 
the inside information definition is significant: 
•  specific or precise information; 
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•  the information has not been made public; 
•  the information is obtained or learned as an insider; and 
•  if it were made public it would be likely to have material effect on the price or  
 value of any security on a regulated market.  
 
A brief overview of these elements is given below. 
 
Specific or precise information 
 
The specific or precise requirement is the same as the UK legislation on insider dealing 
which is modelled on the EU Directive on Insider Dealing.173  Maug contends that the 
EU legislation requiring inside information to be precise is a narrow definition that 
creates a grey zone, whereby information is private but cannot be classified as inside 
information.174                                                          
 
The focus on specific or precise requirement is absent in the insider trading legislation of 
Australia, Corporations Act, 2001. Information is broadly defined to include matters of 
supposition and other matters that are insufficiently definite to warrant being made 
known to the public; and matters relating to the intentions or likely intentions of a 
person.175 It is an inclusive definition rather than exhaustive and cast the net wider than 
the South African legislation.  It has been argued that the specificity or precision 
requirement removes vagueness and serves to assure market participants that 
transactions based on rumours, suspicion, conjecture, speculation, or a combination 
thereof, do not fall within the prohibition.176 However, it is possible information can be 
specific but may be vague or remain imprecise, as for example where an insider having a 
specific knowledge of an imminent issue of rights offer but not knowing the exact 
details of the issue. 
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‘The Act does not define what constitutes specific or precise information and the courts 
will determine this on a case-by-case basis. What may constitute specific or precise 
information in one situation may possibly not do so in another, depending on the 
surrounding circumstances.’177       
        
Information has not been made public 
 
In order to liable for insider trading offence, the information must not have been made 
public prior to dealing in securities. This requirement for putting information in the 
public domain before dealing is to ensure that all market participants have equal access 
to relevant information. Section 74 of the Act gives guidance on ascertaining whether 
the information is public. It provides that: 
 
      ‘(1)  For the purposes of the definition of  “inside information” , information is regarded as having 
              been made public in circumstances which include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(a) When the information is published in accordance with the rules of the relevant regulated 
market for the purpose informing clients and their professional advisers; 
(b) when the information is contained in records which by virtue of any enactment are open 
to  inspection by the public; or 
(c) when the information can be readily acquired by those likely to deal in any listed securities─ 
     (i)  to which the information relates; or 
           (ii)  of an issuer to which the information relates; or 
(d) when the information is derived from information which has been made public. 
       
       (2)  Inside information which would otherwise be regarded as having been made public must still be 
              so regarded even though─     
               (a)  it can be acquired only by persons exercising diligence or observation, or having expertise; 
               (b)  it is communicated only on payment of a fee; or 
               (c)  it is only published outside the Republic.’ 
 
The scope of determining whether information has been made public is wide and non- 
exhaustive as these are not the only circumstances in which information would be 
regarded as being in the public arena. The discretion which the regulators had in the 
second limb of the definition in the Insider Trading Act has been made mandatory. 
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Inside information may be regarded as having been made public in that Act (s 3(2)), is 
now must still be regarded as having been made public (s 74 (2)). Although the 
definition takes care of analyst use of research reports, information obtained from 
foreign markets and obscured sources, the inside information definition is incongruous 
as it does not explicitly delineate information which has not been made public. This 
makes the issue of information having been made public contentious and would make it 
more difficult to obtain evidence for effective prosecution and conviction of insider 
trading cases. 
  
The information is obtained or learned as an insider 
 
Luiz observed in the Insider Trading Act that the criterion that the information is 
obtained or learned as an insider is dealt with in a circular manner.178 For an information 
to be considered as inside information it must have been obtained as an insider a term 
which in turn is defined in section 72 of the Act as person who has inside information.179 
‘Thus if a person does not obtain information or learn it as an insider, then such person 
would not be regarded, for the purposes of the Act, as trading by virtue of inside 
information.  However, it is important to realise that the definition of an insider is very 
broad and it can encompass even someone who is not connected with the concerned 
company, ie a tippee.’180 The definition of an insider is discussed in 3.2 below.  
  
The information if it were made public it would be likely to have material effect on 
the price or value of any security on a regulated market 
  
Materiality is evaluated against price movement but the Act does not define material 
effect or provide any list of events which will make it material. This gives room for the 
regulator or courts to determine what information could influence price or value of 
securities with changing circumstances. However, an insider with informational 
advantage acquisition or disposal of securities that will not cause price movement of the 
value of securities would seem to fall outside the prohibition. ‘Thus the information that 
would not have a material effect on the price or value of securities is excluded from the 
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prohibition. If the information will only lead to a slight increase in the value of securities 
and such increase will be immaterial then such information is excluded.’181                      
 
In the UK materiality of information determination like South Africa is based on price-
sensitivity. Although, under United States jurisdiction, information is material for the 
purposes of insider trading if it is such that someone in possession of inside information 
could be expected to succeed to trade in the particular securities to make a profit or 
avoid losses, for practical purposes, price sensitivity is a key concern as well, since 
insider trading prosecutions are generally only brought where there is a movement in 
stock prices after the information became public.182 In Malaysia, insider trading 
regulations in Division 2 of the Securities Industry Act 1983 and provisions in sections 
132A & B of the Companies Act 1965, provide a catalogue of events for which 
information can always be regarded as material. Such an approach produces certainty. 
However, the impact of a specific event may not produce the same result of price 
movement on the value of securities at different times and surrounding circumstances.  
       
4.2 WHO IS AN INSIDER? 
    
The definition of an insider in section 72 of the Act:  
              “insider” means a person who has inside information─ 
(a) through─ 
(i)   being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities listed 
       on a regulated market to which the inside information relates; or 
 (ii)   having access to such information by virtue of employment, office or                         
         profession; or 
(b) where such person knows that the direct or indirect source of the information 
was a person contemplated in paragraph (a).” 
 
As discussed above, there are two approaches to defining who can be regarded as an 
insider, the ‘person connection’ and ‘information connection’ approaches.183  The person 
connection approach regards a person having information and who has a direct or 
indirect relationship with the issuer of the securities as an insider and are often regarded 
as primary insiders. This covers persons in s 72(a) of the Act, including natural persons 
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in their capacity as directors, shareholders, employees, other officials of the company 
such as legal advisers who are not employees, brokers, government functionaries, bank 
managers and juristic persons such as the issuer of the securities itself, companies, a 
trust and partnerships.                                                                                                            
 
The information connection approach regards any person who has inside information 
that is price-sensitive which has not been made public to be liable regardless of their 
relationship to the source of the information or irrespective of how the person learned 
the information.  For example a barman, the taxi driver who overhears directors or other 
primary insiders discussing non-public price-sensitive information such as a change in 
earnings or dividends and deals in the securities will be caught by the prohibition.184  
 
Persons who are associated with the company through being directors, officers, 
employees or shareholders and those by virtue of their employment, office or profession 
are regarded as primary insiders (persons in paragraph (a)).  Secondary insiders are 
persons who obtain their inside information directly or indirectly from someone else in 
paragraph (a). They are sometimes referred to as tipees.   
 
The person connection approach is narrow as it covers only persons with connection 
with the issuer of the securities. Australian legislation has adopted the broad definition 
of information connection of an insider.185 It requires that an insider must possess inside 
information that is not generally available which the insider knows or ought reasonably 
to know that the matters it would have material effect on the price or value of securities 
of a body corporate.186 It is enough the alleged insider trader possessed the information 
at the time of trading or procured another person to trade.  Su and Berkahn contend that 
trading with knowledge while in possession of information, rather than a person’s 
connection, is what can detrimentally affect the market.187 The South African definition 
of an insider fits with the personal connection approach as the person is expected to 
know the source of the information. 
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In some jurisdictions such as the UK, corporate entities are not included in the definition 
of insiders, however, natural persons who carry on transactions on their behalf to 
commit insider trading offences are held liable. It seems the intention of parliament to 
include juristic persons in the definition of insiders is to motivate them to introduce and 
maintain high standards whilst handling information and dealing for the entity’s account. 
In the repealed section 440(1) of the Companies Act, the offence of insider dealing 
could be committed by ‘any person’.   This meant that the crime could be committed by 
natural and legal persons such as companies.  The practical difficulties and the 
effectiveness of the Chinese Wall defences made the King’s Task Group to recommend 
its repeal in its final draft report on insider trading.188    
 
4.3 INSIDER TRADING OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 
 
The offences prohibited by the Act are the same as those contained in section 2 of its 
predecessor, the Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998.  Section 73 of the Act specifies what 
constitutes insider trading offences and the available defences. Four types of conduct of 
a person using inside information are prohibited by the section, namely, dealing for 
one’s own account, dealing for any other person, improper disclosure of information and 
encouraging or discouraging another person dealing based on the inside information.  
Some of the defences which were available to accuse in section 4 of the Insider Trading 
Act have been dropped from the Securities Services Act. The defence that the offender 
would have acted in the same manner even without the inside information has been 
removed. Also the defence that if the insider who disclosed inside information is able to 
prove on balance of probabilities that he or she believed on reasonable grounds, that no 
person will deal in the securities or financial instrument as result of such disclosure has 
been dropped.  
 
4.3.1 Dealing for one’s own account  
 
Section 73(1)(a) prohibits an insider dealing for his or her own account. It states: 
             
        ‘An insider who knows that he or she has inside information and who deals directly or                    
         indirectly or through an agent for his or her own account in securities listed on a regulated  
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         market to which the inside information relates or which are likely to be affected by it                           
         commits an offence.’  
 
Section 73(1)(b) sets out the defences to paragraph (a) that: 
 
       ‘An insider is, despite paragraph (a), not guilty of any offence contemplated in that paragraph 
         if such insider proves on a balance of probabilities that he or she─ 
            (i)  was acting in pursuit of the completion of an affected transaction as defined in section 
                  440A of the Companies Act; 
           (ii)  only became an insider after he or she had given the instruction to deal to an authorised  
                  user and the instruction was not changed in any manner after he or she became an insider.’   
     
4.3.2 Dealing for another person 
 
Section 73(2)(a) prohibits an insider dealing for any other person. It provides that: 
 
      ‘An insider who knows that he or has an inside information and who deals, directly or indirectly, 
        for any other person in the securities listed on a regulated market to which the inside information 
        relates or which are likely to be affected by it commits an offence.’ 
 
Section 73(2)(b) outlines the defences to paragraph (a) that: 
 
      ‘An insider is, despite paragraph (a), not guilty of any offence contemplated in that paragraph if              
        such insider proves on a balance of probabilities that he or she─ 
            (i)  is an authorised user and was acting on specific instructions from a client, save where the  
                  Inside information was disclosed to him or her by that client; 
           (ii)  was acting on behalf of a public sector body in pursuit of monetary policy, policies in  
                  respect of exchange rates, the management of public debt or external reserves; or 
          (iii)  was acting in pursuit of the completion of an affected transaction as defined in section 440A    
                  of the Companies Act;  
          (iv)  only became an insider after he or she had given the instruction to deal to an authorised  
                  user and the instruction was not changed in any manner after he or she became an insider.’ 
 
Consequently, ‘institutions that have been named “market makers” in the bond market 
by the South African Reserve Bank may not be deemed as carrying on insider trading if  
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they are acting under specific instructions from the central bank to deal in bonds.’189  
 
4.3.3 Improper Disclosure of inside information 
 
Section 73(3)(a) prohibits improper disclosure of inside information to another person. It 
states: 
         ‘An insider who knows that he or she has inside information and who discloses the inside   
            information to another person commits an offence.’ 
 
This provision makes the person in possession of information (Mr. Dee) which he has 
knowledge that it is an inside information and discloses it to another person, for example 
to his wife (Mary) to be caught by the prohibition.  Mr. Dee then commits the insider 
trading offence by communicating the information. Mary on the other hand will not be 
guilty of the offence unless she deals in securities with the information received or 
discloses it to a third person or encourages or discourages another person from dealing.  
 
Section 73(3)(b) sets out the defences an accused may use for the offence in paragraph 
(a). It states: 
         ‘An insider is, despite paragraph (a), not guilty of the offence contemplated in that paragraph if 
            such insider proves on balance of probabilities that he or she disclosed the inside information 
            because it was necessary to do so for the purpose of the proper performance of the functions of  
            his or her employment, office or profession in circumstances unrelated to dealing in any security   
            listed on a regulated market and that he or she at the same time disclosed that the information was 
            inside information.’ 
 
In this respect, if a director seeking a legal advice on behalf of the company discloses 
inside information to an attorney in the course of performance of his/her duties will not 
be contravening the offence in section 73(3)(a). 
 
4.3.4 An Insider encouraging or discouraging dealing by another person.       
Section 73(4) of the Act prohibits the conduct of an insider encouraging or discouraging 
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another person dealing in securities. There are no defences specifically stipulated to deal 
with this prohibition. In terms of section 73(4): 
 
          ‘An insider who knows that he or she has inside information and who encourages or causes          
           another person to deal or discourages or stops another person from dealing in the securities 
           listed on a regulated market to which the inside information relates or which are likely to be 
           affected by it commits an offence.’  
 
An insider may encourage or discourage a person to deal or not deal in a specified 
securities without disclosing the inside information.  The insider by so doing 
contravenes the provisions of the section and guilty of the offence.  If the person 
encouraged or discouraged merely acts on the advice given to him to deal or abstains 
from dealing without receiving the inside information, then he is not guilty of the 
offence.      
 
    4.4   CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
 
As discussed above, a person commits a criminal offence by contravening the provisions 
of section 73 of the Act. Section 115 sets out the stiff penalties which could be imposed 
upon successful prosecution and conviction of an accused. A fine not exceeding R50 
million or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years, or to both such fine and 
imprisonment may be imposed.  However, the provisions of section 80(1) require the 
court to take into account when imposing criminal sanctions any award previously made 
for civil remedies under section 77 arising out of the same cause.  
 
4.5   CIVIL LIABILITY 
 
In addition to the criminal sanctions, the Act makes provision for imposition of civil 
liabilities in the form of monetary sanctions on an offender. Section 77 deals with civil 
liability resulting from insider trading. Unlike the criminal sanctions where the 
prosecution has to proof beyond reasonable doubt, the civil penalty requires only the 
lower burden of proof, on a balance of probabilities, to be made against the offender by 
the regulator (FSB).   
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In terms of section 77 of the Act, the FSB has been granted more powers to institute 
civil action against an insider who contravenes the provisions of section 73, if it 
considers that it is in the public interest to do so to obtain the following remedies: 
• recover the profit made or the loss avoided, whether realised or not; 
• award a penalty of an amount up to three times such profit or loss avoided; 
• recoup its legal and investigation costs from amounts recovered and 
distribute the balance to compensate investors who can proof that they 
transacted  in the relevant securities and suffered loss as a result of the 
illegal dealings by the insider at any time between the insider trading and the 
time when the inside information became public; and 
• may also respond positively to an offer of settlement from parties under 
investigation for insider trading. 
 
4.6 ENFORCEMENT 
 
The FSB is empowered by the Act as the regulatory body to oversee insider trading 
regulation in South Africa.190 It is the equivalent of the SEC in the United States 
jurisdiction. The Act established the Directorate of Market Abuse (DMA) to replace 
Insider Trading Directorate (ITD) of the Insider Trading Act 135 of 1998.191                            
 
The ITD was mandated to conduct investigations and institute civil legal action against 
insider trading offenders.  These functions are now carried out by the DMA.  It should 
be pointed out that the scope of the mandate of the DMA is wider than that of the ITD as 
the DMA deals with all forms of market abuse in addition to insider trading cases.  Upon 
investigations, the DMA if appropriate, may institute a derivative civil action and / or 
forward its report to the newly created Enforcement Committee of the FSB for it to be 
dealt with in accordance with section 102 to105.192 Enforcement procedures are 
contained in Chapter IX of the Act. The Enforcement Committee has the mandate to 
impose administrative penalties and compensatory amounts on offenders in sections 104 
and 105 respectively.                
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The right of appeal by an aggrieved person to the decision of a board committee to the 
board and review of a decision of the board itself in a competent court of law is provided 
for in section 111 of the Act. 
 
In terms of section 85 of the Act, the common law rights of any aggrieved person 
resulting from a transaction by another person in contravention of the insider trading 
prohibition is protected. The aggrieved person may institute a legal action in his own 
right against the offender to recover his loss. However, any amount awarded to him by 
the court will be deducted from claims amount to be received from the FSB.193            
 
The common law principles of vicarious liability are applicable to the civil liability of 
insider trading.194 ‘It is unclear to what extent employers are exposed to vicarious 
liability in the insider dealing context.  In terms of the general principles governing 
vicarious liability the employer can escape such liability if the employee has (1) 
subjectively viewed, promoted only his own interests, and (2) objectively viewed, 
entirely disengaged himself from his contractual duties.’195  
 
Criminal prosecutions are the responsibility of the Directorate of Public Prosecutions 
and are its prerogative to act on insider trading cases referred to it by the FSB. 
 
From the South African perspective, insider trading is an affront to the integrity and 
proper functioning of financial markets and the legislature has made concerted efforts to 
regulate and eradicate the practice.196 This rationale for regulating insider trading fits in 
with the market efficiency and market fairness arguments for the prohibition of insider 
trading as they focus on the impact of using inside information on the market. The Act 
makes insider trading a criminal offence and provision is made for offenders to incur 
civil liability or both.  Previous attempts regulating insider trading yielded no success in 
the prosecution of offenders. This seems to legitimize proponents of insider trading 
argument that insider trading laws are ineffective and difficult to enforce.  However, the 
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civil remedies component of the Act and its predecessor has culminated in recovery of 
profits and penalties from offenders, implying that enforcement of insider trading laws 
work. 197   It remains to be seen how successful the Act will be in terms of successful 
prosecutions of offenders. Flaws in the Act should be amended to improve its 
effectiveness.    
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                                                 CHAPTER 5 
 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS  
 
There is a consensus achieved among governments around the world that insider trading 
laws are good for the society and firms as well consider insider trading  undesirable and 
therefore they have implemented policies in restricting insider trading.198 ‘Every 
developed country today has these insider trading laws, and four out of five emerging 
market economies have it.’199 Insider trading laws of most countries are designed to 
preserve the integrity of fair and efficient capital markets in order to promote investor 
confidence in the markets. This is evident in section 2 of aims of the Securities Services 
Act which embodies insider trading regulation in South Africa.   Included in the aims of 
the Act are the three objectives of good securities market regulation recommended in the 
‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ published by the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in 1998 and updated in March 2003: 
(i) investor protection (ii) ensuring that markets are fair, efficient and transparent, and 
(iii) reducing systemic risks.200 The legislation against insider trading and regulatory 
mechanisms is regarded to be effective if it is capable of eradicating the practice or 
reducing its incidence. This chapter examines the effectiveness of insider trading 
legislations and the extent to which the regulators are able to maintain a fair, honest and 
efficient capital markets.                                                 
 
5.1 CONSTRAINTS IN THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
 
Regulatory bodies encounter serious problems in policy implementation to protect 
investors and issuers of securities.  Shin asserts that the constraint in achieving the 
objective of the regulatory policy is that the insider is not the only trader who trades on 
information about the firm.201 Market professionals who act as agents for investors or as 
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part of the market mechanism itself such as investment advisors, securities analyst and 
brokers create market based information or receive corporate based information because 
of their special position or function in the market.202  They spend resources to acquire 
superior information about the firm, but their information-based trading is not subject to 
the same regulatory restriction and this makes complete ban of insider trading 
impossible.203 They can reap the same profits and cause the same problems as traditional 
corporate insiders by trading on inside information or tipping others.  Stricter regulatory 
policy results in increased profit for market professionals at the expense of liquidity 
traders thereby defeating the regulator’s objective of minimizing trading loss of liquidity 
traders.204 Caccese argues that the financial analyst plays an important role in the 
securities markets that needs to be protected from some of the chilling effects that ill-
defined or selectively enforced insider trading rules have on the dissemination of 
information essential for financial analyst to perform their jobs.205          
 
Another problem encountered by the regulatory authority relates to the intangible nature 
of the good being controlled - information. It is easily communicated to third parties and 
sometimes unconsciously.  ‘The regulator faces a “first accessing person” problem, that 
is, there is always a first person who has access to the information.  As consequence, 
even if this person is under great scrutiny, the regulator is confronted with an additional 
problem.  He cannot prevent this person from communicating this information to a third 
party except by prohibiting this person from accessing the information, which is 
impossible because that would mean prohibiting her from performing her task.’206 More 
than one person in a corporation may have access to material information who may 
communicate to third parties, and they in turn may communicate directly or indirectly to 
others. As the network widens, the information become distorted and becomes difficult 
for the regulator to trace back to the source. This increases the potential for illegal 
transactions.  For insider trading regulation to be effective, the problem must be attacked 
at its source, that is, the first individual who has access to inside information.207  
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Regulatory authorities such as FSB and the SEC use a multi-pronged strategy to detect 
and prosecute illegal insider trading including surveillance, tip-off from informants or 
ex-spouses, tangible evidence such as notes, memoranda or telephone conversations 
which indicate that an investor traded on the basis of inside information, statistical and 
other circumstantial evidence. 208  
 
The lack of hard evidence due to the intangible nature of inside information and 
dependence on circumstantial evidence such as unusual price movements on a trading 
day to detect and prosecute insider trading violations poses problems which undermine 
the effectiveness of the regulation itself.209 The regulators criterion to trigger an 
investigation is when the price movement during a trading day exceeds a certain 
threshold.  Insiders with accurate inside information are better placed to predict 
accurately future securities prices and are also in a position to predict when the regulator 
is going to suspect that non-public information has been circulated and insider trading 
has been taking place. Consequently, the insiders will modify and adopt trading 
strategies to avoid detection by the regulator thereby making insider trading regulation 
ineffective.210  
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
5.2 RECORD OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS ENFORCEMENT. 
 
The theories underlying insider trading regulation and sanctions imposed are applied to 
varying degrees in different countries. The detection and severity of sanctions handed 
down to offenders of insider trading serves as the main deterrent against the practice.                                                                                              
‘Most countries have rules against insider trading but the temptation for insiders to 
violate the rules still remains.’211 Shin argues that it is not the existence of the laws 
making insider trading illegal that matters but how strictly the law is enforced, which in 
turn is determined by the regulatory policy.212 There has been conflicting findings of 
various studies on the effectiveness of insider trading laws enforcement.                                                                                   
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Bettis et al reviewed a number of empirical studies and found that in the USA, despite 
increased legal and regulatory focus governing corporate insider actions, insiders are 
able to extract significant gains from non-public information.213  The preponderance of 
empirical evidence indicates that insiders tend to purchase more shares than expected 
before “good news” events like takeover announcements and positive earning news but 
sell more shares than expected before “bad news” events like bankruptcy and negative 
earnings news.214  But few legal actions have been taken and because it is difficult to 
prove when insiders obtain private value-relevant information.  Thus, the legal and 
regulatory prohibitions have not been completely effective in preventing insiders from 
trading using their inside information.215                 
 
The toughness of the law matters and it has been established that insider trading law 
quality and profits made from insider trading display a negative relationship.216 In 
countries with high quality and strict insider trading laws enforcement, profits from 
insider trading is low. ‘The USA is the country where insiders’ profits are the lowest, 
ceteris paribus, but also where insider trading regulation is toughest.  The amount of 
profits realised by insiders is relatively higher in Eastern and Nordic Europe and in 
Canada and lower in the UK.’217 However, by making the market more efficient, the 
market reaction at the announcement of an acquisition is larger and as a result insider 
trading laws have the undesirable effect of creating more room for insiders’ profits as 
they tend to appropriate a larger portion of the total takeover gains.218      
 
In 2002, a study of 103 countries that have stock markets revealed that insider trading 
laws existed in 87 of them but enforcement of these laws are spotty and prosecutions 
had taken place in only 38 of them.219 Various reasons have been advanced for this 
scenario. It includes a finding that some jurisdictions are not interested in, or are not 
prepared to devote the necessary resources to implementation of their insider trading 
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legislation.220 In other jurisdictions the burden of proof on the prosecution is onerous, 
making it more difficult to secure a conviction whilst in others loopholes exist in the 
legislation enacted to regulate insider trading which can be exploited by experienced 
insider dealer.221  It was concluded that enforcement of insider trading laws leads to 
reduction in the cost of equity and increased liquidity levels in a country.222  
           
 Durnev and Nain in an empirical study using a sample of  2 827 firms from 21 countries 
examined insider trading restriction on using private or inside information and reported 
that on the average insider trading restrictions unambiguously reduced the amount of 
private information trading.223 But where control rights is concentrated in the hands of 
large shareholders, insider trading regulation is less effective as they resort to covert 
expropriation of the firms resources.224  On the other hand, Bris in analyzing a study 
sample of 4 541 acquisitions from 52 countries found that insider trading enforcement 
increases both the incidence and the profitability of insider trading.225  
 
In South Africa, prior to the promulgation of the Insider Trading Act, anti-insider 
trading provisions were made in the Companies Act 61 of 1973 which yielded no 
success in criminal prosecutions.226 Civil remedies were ineffective.  The Insider 
Trading Act had provisions for criminal and civil liabilities.  Although no criminal 
prosecutions were reported, the civil liability provision achieved success in terms of 
action being taken against offenders and recovering profits, imposing penalties and 
compensating claimants who were able to prove that they suffered loss in respect of a 
particular alleged dealing.  The Insider Trading Act and its accompanying investigative 
directorate, Insider Trading Directorate (ITD) operated form 17 January 1999 to 31 
January 2005.                                                                                                                           
 
‘The ITD was in operation for five years.  During its lifetime, 164 insider trading 
investigations were completed and considered.  A total of 136 of the investigations were 
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closed because there was no, or insufficient, evidence of insider trading.  All suspicious 
trading patterns brought to the attention of the directorate were investigated. In 28 cases, 
the ITD opted to refer the matter to the prosecuting authorities and/or to institute civil 
action itself.  The civil cases are either in the process of going to trial, or have been 
settled with the FSB.’227 The cases during the time the ITD was in operation culminated 
in R51 608 589 being recovered and 1 218 claimants benefited from the distribution of 
the funds.228    
 
The FSB asserted in its 2005 Annual Report that there was a steady decline in new 
insider trading cases since the inception of the ITD continued during the period under 
review but acknowledged that while insider trading has certainly not been eradicated, 
significant progress has been made.229  The effort and achievement is commendable.   
 
In 2006 the FSB reported that it registered 22 new cases for investigation.230 The graph 
below shows a steady decline of insider trading cases from 78 cases in 1999 to 6 in 2005 
but with a substantial increase in 2006 from the previous years. The FSB explained that 
for the first time, the new cases included possible market manipulation and false 
reporting matters.231                                    
 
                                               
227
 FSB Annual Report 2005 (December 2005) at 54. 
     Available at ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/documents/AReport08_2005.pdf (Accessed 14 December 2006). 
228
 Ibid 
229
 Ibid 
230
 FSB Annual Report 2006 (Dated 1December 2006) at 56.  
      Available at ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/documents/AReports08_2006.pdf (Accessed 14 December 2006). 
231
 Ibid 
68 
Figure 1: Graph showing insider trading cases investigated by the FSB.        
                   
Source: FSB Annual Report 2006232        
  
The decline in reported cases shows that the insider trading laws enforcement is 
effective in reducing the incidence of insider trading in South Africa. However, the 
reported decline could be due to the fact that insider trading is not being detected by the 
regulatory authorities.  It is better to have a regulation accompanied by good 
enforcement to serve as a deterrent than no law at all; otherwise it will encourage 
abusive managerial practices, lawlessness and reduce confidence in the market.     
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                                                CHAPTER 6 
 
                                       CONCLUSION 
 
Insider trading has been associated with capitalism for its entire history. It is regarded as 
reprehensible for business and society at large.  The need for regulation came to fore 
after the stock market crash in 1929.  The regulation started in the United States and 
spread to other parts of the world.  Today most countries with securities markets around 
the world have passed legislation regulating insider trading.  The objective of insider 
trading regulation is to ensure fairness and integrity of securities market in order to 
promote investor confidence and reduce systematic risk.   
 
Although, insider trading is illegal in the various jurisdictions, it continues to attract a 
debate among legal academics economist, lawyers, and politicians and in the media.  
Deregulators have argued that insider trading is a victimless crime and hurts nobody; 
instead it makes the market more efficient.  The reality is that insider trading introduces 
economic inefficiencies in capital markets and as a result it does not serve the interest of 
society.  It hurts the company, investors and the society at large. It is submitted that 
insider trading with its inherently unequal access to information to all market 
participants, kills competition which is necessary for efficient allocation of a society’s 
limited resources.  In a country where investor protection is weak and insiders’ trade to 
build their personal fortunes, it discourages investment and reduces the credit rating of 
the country. More research needs to be done on the real economic costs of insider 
trading.        
 
The arguments for the prohibition of insider trading are based on market efficiency, 
fiduciary duty, and misappropriation theory and market fairness.  The thrust of the 
fiduciary duty and misappropriation theory rationale is based on the notion that misuse 
of information by corporate insiders having a fiduciary relationship with the company or 
similar relationship with the owner of the information or issuer of the securities 
undermines management of the corporation and hurt the business.  The market 
efficiency and fairness arguments on the other hand are based on the impact that the 
utilization of the inside information will have on the market.  Thus, the market 
70 
efficiency and fairness rationale have a wider scope of application than the fiduciary 
duty and misappropriation theory rationale.  However, insider trading legislation of a 
country is not based on a single legal theory involving the use of inside information. 
 
Differences exist in the approach to insider trading regulation in various jurisdictions. 
The intangible nature of information, the ease with which it is communicated and 
subjected to different interpretation makes drawing up of a comprehensive legislation 
regulating insider trading a complex issue.  No perfect definitions can be drawn for the 
definition of insiders and the various elements of the offence of insider trading. This has 
contributed to difficulties in obtaining evidence to prove insider trading cases.  Insider 
trading offence is intrinsically hard to prove and more so proving it beyond reasonable 
doubt in criminal cases.  Hence, few reported insider trading cases have been 
successfully prosecuted to obtain convictions or none in some jurisdictions as in South 
Africa. This creates the perception that insider trading laws are weak or ineffective.  
 
In South Africa, the civil liability provisions of the Insider Trading Act and the current 
legislation, the Securities Services Act have proved to be successful in reducing the 
incidence of insider trading.  However, more work needs to be done.  Improving insider 
trading detection technology, imposing heavier penalties and improving the quality of 
law enforcement in general will be helpful in combating this corporate crime.  
 
Although regulating insider trading is essential for good corporate governance, 
overregulation of corporate crimes such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of the United States 
may have unanticipated effects of raising costs to corporations and investors. Some 
companies are delisting and going private to escape regulatory costs.         
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